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Preface
Significant progress has been made over the past decade or so in the development of policy 
and legislation that support the recognition of customary rights to land, with important legal 
rulings in Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique, South Sudan, and South Africa. At the same time, 
the strengthening of communities’ traditional rights to use resources has progressed through 
community forest reserves and community conservation areas.
However, many commons remain highly vulnerable, with land being removed by governments 
for national parks and large tracts appropriated for commercial agricultural investment on a 
regular basis (Alden Wily 2011). In particular this is true of the rangelands, where external interest 
in land for agriculture, and in its resources for other commercial ventures such as tourism, has 
grown. Even the most progressive policies and legislation still fail to provide adequate protection 
to many rangeland users and, most commonly, to the poorest and least powerful. At the same 
time, customary institutions that would have provided adequate protection in the past have 
been weakened due to both internal and external influences.
This is the situation faced by many members of the International Land Coalition (ILC) working 
with rural communities who are highly vulnerable to land and resource appropriation and loss. 
In an attempt to address this, in October 2010 ILC brought a group of its members together in 
Addis Ababa to develop a learning initiative that will explore this topic through 2011–2012.1 The 
aim of this initiative is to identify ways in which the security of customary land users over their 
common property resources (including land) can be strengthened. In particular, it will focus 
on multi-use landscapes or territories such as rangelands, where the vulnerability of land and 
resource users is particularly high.
As a first step in the development of the learning initiative, this scoping paper explores past 
and present experiences of land and resource tenure in rangelands (predominantly in Africa, 
where the bulk of the rangelands are located). It discusses the limitations of many of the tools 
and systems used to date, and identifies alternatives that have potential for providing greater 
security of tenure to rangeland users in the future. The further exploration of these alternatives 
will be the task of those taking part in the learning initiative over the next year.
1  ILC members met as part of the ILRI Addis Ababa Share Fair in October 2010. At this meeting the main objective 
and goals for the learning initiative were identified. The primary objective is to improve understanding on how 
rangelands can be better protected for local rangeland users, including pastoralists; and how such security can 
better contribute to development processes under the influence of increasing and new challenges. Secondary 
learning goals were identified as: (i) To better understand different tenure types and governance systems that that 
have had a positive impact towards securing tenure for rangeland users and their development processes; and how 
best these can be adapted to and incorporated into local/national contexts; (ii) To better understand how (current/
improved) legislation and mechanisms for securing rights to resources for rangeland users can be implemented by 
exchanging experiences with those working with and for rangeland users and with/between the rangeland users 
themselves; (iii) To explore the challenges faced by rangeland users in securing rights to resources and identify how 
better we can work together to overcome these; (iv) To build the capacity of ILC members and partners to play a 
greater role in processes, mechanisms and activities for securing rangelands for rangeland users. 
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A cadastral survey is an official mapping 
process that identifies and records the physical 
boundaries of parcels of land.
Commons are defined as lands that rural 
communities possess and use collectively in 
accordance with community-derived norms. 
These norms are variously referred to as 
customary or indigenous tenure regimes. Two 
distinctions are drawn to help clarify their nature. 
First, a distinction is drawn between open access 
common pool resources and commons, the 
former being better defined as unowned and 
unbounded resources available for public use. 
In contrast, commons are discrete land areas, 
of which a known community is acknowledged 
locally as the owner. Second, a distinction is 
drawn between communal lands and commons. 
The former refers to whole customary domains 
and may include both parcels of land over which 
individual and family possession is established 
and collectively owned lands – the commons 
(Alden Wily 2011).
Common property is characterised by the 
following elements: overarching ritual and 
cosmological relations with traditional lands; 
community “rights” of control over land disposal 
(sometimes delegated to traditional leaders); 
kinship or territory-based criteria for land access; 
community-based restrictions on dealings in 
land with outsiders; and principles of reversion 
of unused land to community control (Fitzpatrick 
2005: 454). 
Community is understood as a human group 
sharing a territory and involved in different but 
related aspects of livelihoods – such as managing 
natural resources, producing knowledge and 
culture, and developing productive technologies 
and practices. Communities are by no means 
homogenous, and harbour complex socio-
political relations, with diverging and sometimes 
conflicting views, needs, and expectations. Yet 
they have major common concerns, which in 
healthy situations lead towards various forms of 
collaboration and cohesion (Borrini-Feyerabend 
et al. 2004). 
Co-management describes a partnership 
by which two or more relevant social actors 
collectively negotiate, agree upon, guarantee, 
and implement a fair share of management 
functions, benefits, and responsibilities for 
a particular territory, area, or set of natural 
resources (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004).
Customary institutions are the structures 
and “rules” that provide order to the lives of 
rangeland users and are particular to a group 
and its identity. Customary institutions are 
many and influence if not control what people 
do, how, when, and with whom – from birth 
through marriage and family to death (and even 
afterwards through memory of and respect 
for ancestors). Customary institutions govern 
all aspects of social, cultural, economic, and 
political lives. They are regulatory systems of 
both formal laws and informal conventions 
and behavioural norms, which may include, for 
example, women’s community support systems 
i.e. they are more than male-dominated village 
decision-making bodies.
Customary land rights are where current access 
to land is linked with social norms and networks, 
and where local powers play an important role 
in land rights regulation and conflict resolution 
(Lavigne-Delville 2010).
Customary rangeland management refers 
to the traditional institutions, processes, and 
activities that land users have used (and 
Glossary of terms
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continue to use) to control access to, manage, 
and protect rangeland resources. Customary 
rights to land and resources are often more 
flexible and dynamic than statutory systems, 
and better suit the variability of the rangeland 
ecosystem, allowing for adaption to climatic 
changes and the need for overlapping and 
“fuzzy” access arrangements over common 
property built upon group reciprocity rather 
than individual gain.
Formalising rights refers to processes of 
identifying interests, adjudicating them, and 
registering them. Registration can include titling, 
an exercise in which rights to clearly defined 
land units vested in clearly defined individual or 
group “owners” are documented and stored in 
public registries as authoritative documents, but 
it need not. Rather, it can be the simple writing 
down of land transactions in the presence of the 
recognised local authority or the maintenance 
of land registers to track tenure changes.
Land tenure is the relationship, whether 
legally or customarily defined, among people, 
as individuals or groups, with respect to land 
(for convenience, “land” is used here to include 
other natural resources such as water and trees). 
Land tenure is an institution, i.e. rules invented 
by societies to regulate behaviour. Rules of 
tenure define how property rights to land are 
allocated within societies. They define how 
access is granted, the rights to use, control, and 
transfer land, and associated responsibilities and 
restraints. In simple terms, land tenure systems 
determine who can use what resources for how 
long, and under what conditions (FAO 2002).
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets 
(including both material and social resources), 
and activities required for a means of living. A 
livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and 
recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or 
enhance its capabilities and assets both now and 
in the future, while not undermining the natural 
resource base (Carney 1998).
Pastoralism is a collective livestock-based land 
use and livelihoods system of which a central 
feature is the tracking and utilisation of resources 
across a rangeland that experiences low and 
variable rainfall. Pastoralists may increasingly 
today be involved in other social, political, and 
economic activities, but livestock retains both 
economic and cultural significance for them. 
Rangelands are ecosystems dominated by 
grasses, grasslike plants, forbs, and shrubs. 
Rangelands result through a complex interplay 
of factors: climate, available nutrients and water, 
fire, herbivores (livestock or wild ungulates), 
and human impact. Rangelands tend to occur 
in dryland areas with low and highly variable 
rainfall and often contain a patchwork of 
resources that include not only grasslands but 
also forests, wetlands, and mineral sources. 
Recording is simply a process of writing down 
or mapping different aspects of a piece of land, 
including the boundary, ownership, and/or 
transaction information or details of customary 
groups and local institutions. There are different 
types of land records. Social and physical 
mapping records this information without 
trying to fit any of it into formal legal categories 
or attributing legal status to the records. It is 
also possible to record other information about 
land, such as lease agreements. Land records 
may be stored by customary owners and local 
government or by local traditional land arbiters 
as a statement that all parties accept the process 
and the boundaries. Access to some land records 
may be restricted to certain people (AusAid 
2008).
Registration is the formal recording of land 
tenure arrangements. While registration can 
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include titling (see below), it does not have to. 
Registration can include maps and records as 
well as land registers kept by village chiefs to 
track tenure changes (Lavigne-Delville et al. 
2002; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2008). The key is 
that statutory (parliamentary approved) status is 
given to the records (Alden Wily 2005a), resulting 
in greater tenure security (indefeasibility of title) 
than recording (AusAid 2008).
Sound governance is based on the 
application of principles, such as legitimacy 
and voice (through broad participation and 
consensus-based decisions), transparency 
and accountability, performance (including 
responsiveness to stakeholders, effectiveness, 
and efficiency), fairness (equity and the rule of 
law), and direction (including strategic vision 
and the capacity to respond to unique historical, 
cultural, and social complexities) (Institute on 
Governance 2002). 
A territory is a defined area (including land 
and waters), considered to be a “possession” 
of a person, organisation, institution, state, or 
country sub-division. A territory is likely to have a 
defining impact on the identity of the individual 
or group, often with ancestral and cultural roots.
Titling is an exercise in which rights to clearly 
defined land units vested in clearly defined 
individual or group “owners” are documented 
and stored in public registries as authoritative 
documents, with statutory status.
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of rangelands and 
rangeland users
Rangelands constitute some 35 million sq km 
of the Earth’s surface area, with the majority of 
that in developing countries and some 65% 
(almost 22 million sq km) in tropical Africa (Rass 
2006). An estimated 50 million pastoralists and 
up to 200 million agro-pastoralists live across the 
continent (IIED and SOS Sahel 2010).2 There are 
also a large number of other users who depend 
on the rangelands for their livelihoods, including 
hunter-gatherers, tappers of gums and resins, 
medicinal plant collectors, honey producers, 
and charcoal makers. Many pastoralists carry 
out these tasks too in order to supplement their 
livestock-centred livelihoods.
The majority of rangelands in Africa are found 
within dryland areas that receive less than 
1,000mm of rainfall per year in less than six 
months of a year – the remaining months being 
relatively or absolutely dry (Mortimore 1998). 
Much rainfall is lost through evaporation and 
flash flooding, which also affect “plant-available 
moisture”. As a result, arid/semi-arid rangelands 
produce forage that can be highly variable in 
both time and location. In order to make use of 
the whole rangeland, including the seemingly 
2  The exact number of pastoralists is difficult to establish 
due to definition issues, the lack of inclusion of pastoral-
ists in census data, and the fact that some pastoralists 
have two nationalities (common in the Sahel).
less productive areas, pastoralists require 
access to key resources on both a regular and 
irregular basis.3 In the dry season in particular, 
access is required to dry-season grazing areas 
where permanent water is available. This also 
allows the “resting” of wet-season grazing areas 
and prevents the build-up of disease-carrying 
parasites.
Pastoralism utilises patchy resources effectively, 
through seasonal and responsive movements 
of livestock (Nori 2007). Livestock are carefully 
bred to exploit the unpredictable environment 
in which they live: animals that can find the most 
nutritious grasses available are considered more 
valuable. Essential characteristics include the 
capacity to travel great distances and to cope 
well with little water and high temperatures 
(Krätli 2008). Mobility and flexibility are critical. 
Successful production also relies on the right 
herd mix, including type of animal species 
and sex/age of animals (IIED and SOS Sahel 
2010; Niamir-Fuller 2005). This avoids over-
exploitation of resources and land degradation, 
working with the positive aspects of these 
mainly “disequilibrium”4 environments, and 
3  Such areas are called “key-sites” (Niamir-Fuller 2005) or 
“rangeland productivity hotspots” (Flintan and Cul-
lis 2010). They are also likely to be the “hot spot” areas 
described by Tanner et al. (2009) as being the land/re-
sources that private investors want.
4  Disequilibrium environments are driven by abiotic fac-
tors such as rainfall, so can be highly variable and unpre-
dictable in nature. They tend to jump from one stable 
state to another, rather than follow any clear linear tra-
jectory of progression to a particular vegetative state. 
Concepts such as “carrying capacity” of livestock to veg-
etation have little relevance in such environments.
1 Rangelands, governance, and change
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helps to reduce vulnerability to risks. Severe 
climatic events can change normal use and 
movement in rangelands and, in turn, the rules 
and regulations controlling their access and use. 
Not all areas are limited by water: there are 
pockets of wetlands in Africa such as the 
Fadamas of northern Nigeria, the inner Niger 
Delta in Mali, the Tana Delta in Kenya, and river 
flood plains or margins of lakes elsewhere. 
These offer valuable dry-season grazing, flood 
recession or irrigated farming, and opportunities 
for further diversifying livelihoods.
As pressures to find alternative livelihoods have 
increased and support provided by NGOs and 
government has grown, many pastoralists, 
and in particular women, are establishing 
small business enterprises. These include petty 
trading, the collection and sale of gums and 
resins (some of which are highly valuable5), the 
manufacture of products from non-timber forest 
products such as aloe species or honey, and 
handicrafts. Indeed, drylands present enormous 
opportunities for people, ecosystems, and 
development (IUCN 2009).
Today across Africa a range of pastoral production 
systems exists, differing by scale and regularity 
of movement. These range from highly nomadic 
pastoral systems found in northern Mauritania 
and Namibia to transhumant pastoral systems 
such as the Nilotic tribes of East Africa, the 
Berber of the High Atlas, and herders in Morocco 
and Ethiopia, to agro-pastoral systems such 
as the settled populations in Zimbabwe who 
send their livestock short distances to pasture. 
5  In southeast Ethiopia the average annual cash income 
generated per household from sales of gums and resins 
has been estimated at USD 80. This contributes 33% of 
annual household subsistence costs. Between 1996 and 
2003, Ethiopia exported 16,019 tonnes of gum resins per 
year, worth USD 20.5 million. The price of these products 
would be greatly improved if grading, collection, and 
storage methods were improved (IUCN 2009).
Many move across altitudinal zones (lowland/
highland) (Ethiopia: Flintan et al. 2008; Lesotho: 
Turner 2009; Afghanistan: Alden Wily 2008a) and 
across ecological zones (savanna/forest) (Guinea: 
Fairhead and Leach 1996). They also have strong 
economic and social linkages with urban areas 
and provide benefits well beyond the local area. 
These systems have developed in response to 
local environmental conditions of topography, 
soils, rainfall patterns, and forage species, as well 
as policy issues that either support or restrict 
mobility. Pastoralists in Mauritania, for example, 
have to move more than those in East Africa as 
they live in very arid, sandy environments where 
population densities are low and markets are 
concentrated in the south of the country (Ced 
Hesse, personal communication 2011).
Pastoralism not only feeds the millions of 
people who live in these areas (and those that 
are linked to them) but also makes significant 
contributions to national, regional, and 
international food security, national and regional 
economies, biodiversity, and the environment 
(COMESA 2009; SOS Sahel and IIED 2009; Binot 
et al. 2009; Nori 2007; Rass 2006; Niamir-Fuller 
2005).6 It is predicted that in Africa growth in 
6  Pastoralism in the greater Horn of Africa (GHA) contrib-
utes to more than 23% of livestock production in the 
COMESA region and more than 10% the continent’s live-
stock production. Besides providing meat, milk, blood, 
hides, and skin, pastoralism is the only form of employ-
ment in arid and semi-arid areas (COMESA 2009). Live-
stock is an important foreign currency earner for most 
of the countries in the GHA: for example, in Ethiopia and 
Uganda it accounts for 10% and 8% respectively of cur-
rency earnings. Other indirect economic contributions 
include tourism (e.g. in Kenya this accounts for 12% of 
total GDP and in Uganda 9%) and improvement and 
sustainable management of the environment. In fact, 
such figures are likely to be much higher: GDP is based 
on official statistics and thus ignores non-registered 
transactions such as unofficial cross-border trading. In 
Eastern Africa, unofficial trade has been estimated at 
USD 105 million per year, 100 times greater than the 
average annual official livestock export trade between 
1993 and 2000 (Little 2007). In West Africa, the pastoral 
sector contributes 10–20% of total GDP in Mauritania, 
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the consumption and production of meat and 
milk will far exceed that of other developing 
regions. This “livestock revolution” presents 
major opportunities for livestock-driven poverty 
reduction if facilitating conditions are supported 
– in particular, in African rangelands (COMESA 
2009). 
It is often argued by policy-makers that modern-
day ranching is a more productive system than 
traditional livestock management. However, 
research studies carried out in Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Botswana, and Zimbabwe comparing the 
productivity of ranching with pastoralism all 
came to the same conclusion: pastoralism gives 
a greater return per hectare (between 150% 
and 188%) than ranching, whether measured 
in terms of meat production, generating energy 
(calories), or providing cash. And whereas 
commercial cattle ranching tends to specialise in 
only one product – meat – pastoralism provides 
a diverse range of outputs including milk, blood, 
manure, and traction (IIED and SOS Sahel 2010). 
Further, pastoralists are poor people compared 
with ranchers not because of low productivity, 
but because their numbers per unit area are 
high. Pastoralists try to optimise the number of 
people supported per unit area, while ranchers 
aim for optimum economic returns per unit 
of livestock (usually only in terms of meat). 
Pastoralism amongst the Boran in Kenya/
Ethiopia directly supports six to seven people 
per sq km of rangeland, while ranches in Kenya 
support no more than 0.5 people and Australian 
ranches 0.002 people per sq km (Nori 2007).
Pastoralism is also good for the environment, 
Mali, Niger, and Chad and there is active trade, with Sa-
helian countries (e.g. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) in the arid 
and semi-arid parts of the region exporting livestock to 
humid coastal countries (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Ni-
geria) (ALive 2007). Further opportunities, such as “pay-
ments for environmental services” from e.g. carbon se-
questration, offer even greater sources of revenue.
encouraging biodiversity and preventing the 
invasion of unpalatable plants, with many areas 
now considered as “grazing-dependent” (Niamir-
Fuller 2005). The rangelands of eastern and 
southern Africa shelter the greatest diversity of 
large mammals found anywhere. By enabling the 
maintenance of wildlife habitats outside state-
protected areas, pastoralist land management 
practices provide important ecological services, 
estimated as being worth more than USD 80 
million annually, at the macro-economic level in 
northern Tanzania (Nelson, unpublished paper 
in Roe et al. 2009). The average floral richness of 
savanna areas (c. 1,750 species) is not far below 
that of rainforest (c. 2,020 species) (Menaut 
1983). Rangelands can be used sustainably if 
their ecosystems remain intact. They are most 
productive when most biodiverse, assuming 
they are put to a variety of uses (Blench and 
Sommer 1999). 
Customary land use 
and tenure systems
In the past, pastoralists had access to vast tracts 
of rangeland that were managed through 
customary institutions at different levels and 
for different resources. The sound management 
of rangelands was, and in some cases still is, 
promoted through norms of inclusion (and to 
a lesser extent exclusion) designed for pastoral 
activity. In Borana, Ethiopia, for example, these 
norms are called seera marraa bisanii – “the law 
of grass and water”. Resources are managed as 
common property with access derived in the 
first instance through being a member “of the 
group” (Cousins 2007). 
Tenure systems have developed in response 
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to ecological and social dynamics. They secure 
control over the key resources required for 
times of scarcity (such as dry-season water 
points and grazing/forage) while maximising 
access under conditions of plenty (such as wet-
season grazing commons) (Ced Hesse, personal 
communication 2011). They reduce the need for 
exclusion mechanisms and maximise benefits 
for the group and thus the individual as part 
of that group. When such benefits diminish, 
however, there is more incentive to challenge 
the group and to seek individual rewards.
Regulating laws and institutions tend to work first 
and foremost on the basis of territory or domain 
under which a hierarchy of nested, overlapping 
bundles of rights for different sets of users exist, and 
often for the same resource (Ethiopia: Boku Tache 
and Irwin 2003; West Africa: Hesse and Thébaud 
2006; Mongolia: Fernandez-Gimenez 2006; global: 
Fuys et al. 2008, Nori 2007, Niamir-Fuller 2005). 
These rights can be grouped as:
•	 Use rights, such as the right to access the 
resource (for example, to move livestock 
across land), withdraw from a resource (tap 
gums and resins), or exploit a resource for 
economic benefit;
•	 Control or decision-making rights, such as 
the right to manage (dig a well), or exclusion 
(prevent others from accessing the well);
•	 Transfer, sale, or alienation rights, such 
as renting pasture, or selling firewood or 
charcoal, or producing honey – becoming 
increasingly common as resources are 
commoditised (see below). 
Customary institutions and tenure regimes (such 
as those that control grazing across a “dheeda” – a 
traditional grazing unit – in Boran areas in Kenya 
and Ethiopia) govern the different overlapping 
layers of rights to “tenure niches” (Maxwell and 
Wiebe 1998), such as for a water source or a tree 
(e.g. Ekwar, Turkana: Barrow 1990). Land and/or 
resources are held “in trust” for use by the group 
(and other permitted “outside” users). They are 
not “owned” (in the formal sense of the word). 
Due to their high connectivity, it is impossible 
to focus on and, for example, change one part 
of the territory, domain, or system without 
affecting the rest.
“Land” is a political space where different 
groups of actors negotiate, conflict and/
or reach agreement over access, and use 
and manage physical land and its resources. 
Through negotiations and reciprocity required 
for resource sharing, the use and management 
of rangeland resources play a key role in the 
development of social capital and of a strong 
social fabric among rangeland communities 
(Cotula 2006). 
In Borana, for example, words such as “we” 
and “our” feature predominantly in Boran 
conversations, expressing the philosophy of 
collective resource ownership (Ethiopia/Kenya: 
Boku Tache and Irwin 2003). This is key to 
ensuring access to resources in an unpredictable 
environment. Even the poorest members of rural 
communities, such as those without land or 
too little land to live on (the “land poor”), share 
the customary ownership of these estates with 
other, richer members of the community. This 




interventions in “the 
commons”
Until the early 1900s, “the commons” and 
customary systems of land use were allowed 
to develop with little external interference. 
However, as interest in Africa as a source of 
natural resources and labour grew, so too did 
this type of interest, in particular focusing on the 
vast and seemingly “empty”’ or “undeveloped” 
rangelands. 
Kenya, for example, saw the imposition of 
colonial policy and law in its rangelands. 
Beginning with the Maasai treaties of 1904 and 
1911, and continuing through colonial regimes 
such as the Kenya Land and East Africa Royal 
Commissions, “unoccupied” Maasai lands were 
appropriated, native reservations were created, 
and grazing and development schemes divided 
up the rangelands into ranches, later becoming 
individualised. The outcomes were a shrunken 
resource base that proved inadequate to sustain 
Maasai systems of production and an increased 
sense of land insecurity (Mwangi 2005) (see Box 
1.1). In Botswana, a similar approach was applied, 
with similar outcomes: those who were too poor 
or too weak to legitimise their claim to what had 
been common pool resources were excluded 
from the privatisation processes (Taylor 2007). 
Across the Sahel in West Africa, land was 
nationalised and customary institutions were 
disempowered. This led to the wholesale 
appropriation of all common land and its transfer 
Box 1.1: Why group ranches failed
In the early 1960/1970s the Kenyan Group (Representatives) Act created exclusive land ownership and rights among groups 
of Maasai residing within an identified area. A land title was issued to each group, formalising its collective rights to the land. 
These “group ranches” aimed to privatise Maasai land (albeit collectively) and reduce further encroachment and appropriation. 
However, in practice the lands were systematically grabbed, gifted, or sold and over time many Maasai (and in particular the 
less powerful and the poor) have lost access and control. 
Despite this, the new independent government continued the privatisation process and in the early 1980s began calling for 
sub-division. By this time, Maasai group ranch members also supported sub-division, due to increasing population pressure; 
the notion that development and progress could best proceed with individual ownership; problems of differential access to 
and exploitation of group resources; immigration of outsiders and the intrusion of their cattle onto communally held lands; 
and the popular idea that the “vacant” group-held lands should be made available to settlers from other overpopulated areas 
of the country. Besides these factors, group decision-making was breaking down: it was more difficult to enforce traditional 
livestock numbers and settlement patterns. 
The process of allocating parcels of land from the previously held collective unit was exclusionary and unequal. Poorer 
herders with little influence were assigned smaller parcels relative to wealthier ones or to those with direct connections to 
the management committee. Youth and women were excluded from the ranch committees’ decision-making processes, and 
their rights to the collective holdings were subordinated to the group members’ need to maximise the size of their individual 
landholdings. Community identity and membership were replaced by inheritance rights as the chief factor in land claims. 
When youth tried to protest these changes, their concerns were ignored by elders, the committees, the courts, and politicians. 
Women had already been excluded, as only male household heads were allowed to be members of the new group ranches 
when they were formed in the1960s (Mwangi 2005).
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to the public domain under government-
controlled management (Hesse and Trench 
2000). In the Niger Delta, for example, the French 
colonial government totally undermined the 
customary system for regulating the resource 
access of Dina pastoralists. The land tenure and 
development policies of a succession of post-
independence governments have exacerbated 
this situation. The proliferation of state institutions 
involved in one way or another in allocating 
access to resources, often without reference to 
one other, has further weakened the powers of 
the customary institutions including the jowro. 
The cumulative effect of these measures has 
been the gradual opening up of the Delta’s 
resources to outsiders, without any assurance 
that their numbers and modes of production 
are effectively regulated either by the state or by 
customary authorities (Moorehead 1998).
Individual land titles were seen as a requirement 
for economic development, based on the belief 
that private title is necessary for investments in 
land in order to improve productivity and for 
using land as collateral for loans. The powerful 
influence of Hardin’s paper “The Tragedy of 
the Commons” (1968) led to a misreading of 
common property regimes and encouraged the 
overriding of customary tenure systems.
Indeed, legislation across Africa has not only 
failed to recognise pastoral land use but has 
also given priority land-use rights to agricultural 
production (West Africa: Hesse and Thébaud 
2006). Mobility has been seen as a problem to be 
eliminated, not a trump card to be strengthened 
(Niamir-Fuller 2005). Individualisation has been 
promoted, rather than collective property rights 
strengthened.
However, despite the drive by governments 
to formalise tenure systems, and in particular 
through individualisation of property, in many 
pastoral areas customary tenure systems, 
including common property, have remained 
resilient. Not only did governments fail to 
govern these areas, but also local communities 
failed to give government schemes and tenure 
legitimacy, preferring to remain governed 
by customary practices (Alden Wily 2011). 
In many situations, this has resulted in the 
development of a dualism of tenure where 
legislation and regulations say one thing and 
practice shows another. Unfortunately, as 
rangeland areas become more valuable and are 
increasingly targeted by national governments 
for development and investment, customary 




Today, still, little has been done to address the 
insecurities that pastoralists and other rangeland 
users face. Droughts seem to be occurring more 
frequently and pastoralists’ ability to overcome 
them has been reduced (Horn/East Africa: 
Flintan 2011b). Per capita ownership of livestock 
has declined significantly, so that for many 
pastoralist families it is now below the minimum 
subsistence level (Rass 2006). Inappropriate land 
tenure policies and strategies of the past have 
been highlighted as a root cause of the food 
insecurity and poverty found in the rangelands 
today (Sudan: Shazali and Ahmed 1999; East 
Africa: Cullis and Watson 2004, Odhiambo 2006).
Decentralised management of natural resources 
in the Sahel has gained greater backing from 
international and regional conventions. Central 
governments are verbally supporting local 
participation by reforming legislation 
and passing new laws to allow a greater 
involvement of civil society in the 
management of natural resources. However, 
in practice little has changed and little 
power has been effectively passed down 
(Hesse and Trench 2000). And although 
development agencies, governments, 
and NGOs have increased their focus on 
pastoral areas and budgets for “developing” 
these areas, the fundamental root causes of 
rangeland users’ insecurities, such as a lack 
of rights to resources and land, fail to be 
addressed. 
The premise underlying this paper is 
that, despite the challenges, land policy 
reform can be undertaken and/or existing 
enabling land policy can be implemented 
in a manner that recognises and, where 
thought necessary, formalises customary 
land and resource tenure systems in the 
rangelands. In general, local people are still 
the most effective land managers of natural 
resources, as their livelihoods depend upon 
them.
This paper strives to take into account the 
diversity of needs of all rangeland users. 
It provides an overview of different tools 
and systems available to land reformists, 
practitioners, and communities that can 
be used to better protect the rights of 
rangeland users. It concludes by proposing 
key elements of a strategy that can be used 
to improve land use planning and land/
resource tenure formalisation processes and 
results. The elements of this strategy need 
further exploration in local contexts, and 
this will form an important part of the ILC 





Identifying how customary tenure can be 
appropriately formalised, and in particular 
tenure that provides for the needs of rangeland 
users, poses significant challenges for lawyers 
and policy-makers. Tanner et al. (2009) suggest 
three key areas of concern:
1. How to incorporate the many different local 
land management systems within a single 
land management framework that is not 
top-heavy and too cumbersome to use;
2. How to devise a system that can adequately 
record dynamic and shifting patterns of land 
use that incorporate a range of de facto 
private, individualised customary rights and 
areas of common use, such as forests and 
grazing land; 
3. How to establish a technical approach that 
is cost-effective yet still accurate enough 
to establish borders and other features on 
official maps.
Once such a system is devised, it then needs to 
be implemented. This requires new roles and 
responsibilities, attitudes, and ways of working 
for and with the state, customary institutions, 
and other actors, as well as new relationships 
that may be challenging to build. 
This section highlights some of the land use 
planning and tenure formalisation tools and 
processes that are being developed and 
implemented in Africa’s rangelands. Though 
these tools and processes are certainly an 
improvement on past land use planning and 
tenure interventions, there is still much room 
for further improvement. This is discussed in the 
latter part of the section. 
Improved policy and 
regional integration
The pace of policy and land reform in many 
countries in Africa has been considerable in 
recent years. In West Africa, the governments 
of Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, and Cameroon have all passed specific 
laws to protect pastoral land and to facilitate 
livestock mobility, both within countries and 
across borders (Nori 2007; IUCN 2011). Pastoral 
codes or charters have been developed (Hesse 
and Trench 2000). In Mauritania, the code is 
uncompromising on this issue, stipulating 
that “pastoral mobility is protected under 
all circumstances and can only be limited 
temporarily and for reasons of the safety of 
animals and crops, and this in accordance with 
the provisions of the law” (Hesse and Thébaud 
2006). 
In East Africa and the Horn, governments have 
recognised the rights of rangeland users such 
as pastoralists in their constitutions, policies, 
and legislation. In Uganda, for example, the 
constitution now provides assurance that 
customary property rights have equivalent legal 
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force with statutory entitlements. Ministries 
have been created that deal specifically with 
livestock and pastoral areas, including Kenya’s 
new Ministry for the Development of Northern 
Kenya and Other Arid Lands and the Ministry of 
Livestock Development and Fisheries in Tanzania. 
In Ethiopia, regional governments are now 
designing policies and legislation for resource 
tenure in pastoral areas based upon rights given 
to land users not to be dispossessed from their 
communal grazing lands (under the Constitution 
and the 2005 Rural Land Administration and Use 
Proclamation No. 456/2005).
The need for mobility across borders to sustain 
productive rangeland systems is also being 
recognised, including across national borders. 
In West Africa, the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) has led the 
way, supporting an institutional framework to 
facilitate cross-border livestock mobility. The 
ECOWAS International Transhumance Certificate 
provides for cross-border movements between 
the 15 member states and the facilitation of trans-
border agreements. In theory, herders can obtain 
these certificates from their local authorities 
without great difficulty: the challenge is to make 
them work. The Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) also has an initiative 
aimed at improving livestock trade in its region: 
there are plans to introduce a livestock “green 
card” to ease cross-border movement modelled 
on the ECOWAS cattle certificate (IIED and SOS 
Sahel 2010; Binot et al. 2009).
“Improved” land 
tenure interventions
As more enabling policies and legislation have 
been produced, different types of intervention 
have been developed that have attempted to 
increase the security of rangeland users, with 
varying degrees of success. These include:
1. Consolidation of rural laws and regulations;
2. Registration of customary individual or 
family/lineage “collective” landholdings;
3. Regulation and registration of seasonal 
movements, protection of grazing areas 
and livestock corridors, and development of 
pastoral zones, water points, and cattle posts;
4. Formalisation of locally developed 
agreements for resource sharing; and
5. Recognition and formalisation of common 
property tenure.
1. Consolidation of rural laws and 
regulations
Since colonial times, governments have seen the 
variability in drylands and customary institutions 
that manage them as a constraint, and they 
have tried to overcome this perceived constraint 
by bringing order and stability to pastoral 
environments and systems. In Niger, the Code 
Rural attempted to clarify what were perceived 
to be a mass of contradictory rules regulating 
land tenure at the local level. The basic principle 
was not to introduce new tenure rules, but to 
formalise customary laws and give them the 
same legal status as statutory laws (Hesse and 
Trench 2000). The same principle was applied to 
Sharia and animist laws.
However, these processes ignored the 
complexities and changing nature of customary 
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land rights in Niger and failed to accommodate 
the diversity, variability, imprecision, and 
flexibility of local rules, which are difficult (if 
not impossible) to capture on paper (Cousins 
2002; Hesse and Trench 2000). As a result, Lund 
(1998) concludes that the implementation of 
the Code, although designed to enhance clarity, 
certainty, and institutional order, has in fact had 
the opposite effect: increased unpredictability, 
increased institutional incoherence, and a 
greater state presence but with ever decreasing 
legitimacy. This has led to a number of conflicts 
at the local level as people have sought to 
register their (final) claims to land.
2. Registration of customary 
individual or family/lineage 
“collective” landholdings
The majority of land tenure interventions in the 
rangelands have focused on the strengthening 
of individual or family “collective” parcels of land 
in and around settlements for livestock holding 
or agriculture (see, for example, Tunisia: Ngaido 
and McCarthy 2005; Niger: Issa and Maroussa 
2010; Benin: Lavigne-Delville 2010, Mongbo 
2010; Uganda: Fuys et al. 2008). Based on 
customary individual holdings, land registration 
is usually accompanied by a cadastral survey – 
an official mapping process that identifies and 
records the physical boundaries of each land 
parcel. In general, such systems are not able 
to cope with complexities of overlapping and 
interlocking rights, or of secondary rights.
In West Africa, governments have experimented 
with approaches that include the granting of 
rights to villages to manage their own territories 
(gestion de terroirs villageois). PFRs (plans 
fonciers ruraux or rural land use plans) are 
being produced in and around villages in Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea, Benin, Niger, and Burkina Faso, 
amongst others, following similar processes. 
Existing parcels of rights are identified and 
demarcated through surveys in the presence of 
rights holders and their neighbours. These can 
be drawn on an orthophoto (aerial photographs 
geometrically corrected to a uniform scale) and/
or detailed through cadastral mapping. The 
rights-holder and his/her neighbours verify and 
sign the survey record (procès-verbal) (Lavigne-
Delville 2010).
However, though such methods provide 
communities with greater control to manage 
their lands, the government establishes the laws 
and regulations under a national framework, 
and not with the communities themselves (Ced 
Hesse, personal communication 2011). Again 
this compromises the relevance of the laws at 
the community level, restricting flexibility and 
the incorporation of local norms and practices. 
Where rights to a piece of farmland are held 
collectively, a recorded “administrator” manages 
Box 2.1: Experiences from Benin
In Benin, the 2007 law on rural land allows a “land certificate” to be provided for registered plots. To date these have been 
allocated only for individual or collective farm holdings and not for pastoral purposes i.e. common property. Land certificates 
can be sold or used as collateral. However, the state does not grant them any authenticity, as opposed to land titles. On request, 
land certificates can be transformed into land titles through a process known as immatriculation. A land administration body 
is set up for these certificates, coupling village-level committees for the formalisation of land transfers and public services at 
commune or district level for issuing new certificates and updating land information. The same maps are used for both land 
certification and land titling (Lavigne-Delville 2010; Mongbo 2010).
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the parcel in the name of the family group that 
owns it. During initial surveys, the decision as 
to which rights are recorded is left to the local 
stakeholders on a case-by-case basis. In theory, 
rights to natural resources and rights delegated 
to third parties can also be recorded. In pilot sites 
in Benin, the average parcel size varies from a few 
hectares to several dozen. Individualised rights or 
the rights of extended families or lineage groups 
are recorded, with internal distribution of rights 
among rights-holders being managed within the 
group (Lavigne-Delville 2010; Mongbo 2010) (see 
Box 2.1). 
Though this process does allow for the registration 
of secondary rights, such as the use of a plot for 
grazing by a visiting pastoralist, experience to date 
has shown that these tend to be marginalised. 
And although it does provide for families or 
kinship groups to hold a parcel of land together, 
it does not provide protection for common land. 
In fact, by pushing forward the registration of 
plots of farmland, the PFR process may become 
responsible for the grabbing and registering, 
and ultimately the removal, of common lands 
including rangelands (Mongbo 2010). 
In Niger, ILC, with funding from the Belgian Fund 
for Food Security (BFFS), has been collaborating 
with civil society and government organisations 
to pilot such a land registering process in 
order to improve good practice. The pilot has 
registered household land parcels, which could 
be used for agriculture or livestock rearing. In 
Dan Saga district, 1,271 landholdings have been 
detailed; this includes information about the 
Figure 2.1: Map of land holdings and migration routes in Dan Saga district, Niger
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ethnic group and sex of the landholder, the type 
of land use, and how the land was acquired (Issa 
and Maroussa 2010). As land holdings have been 
registered, livestock migration routes (couloir de 
passage) to seasonal grazing areas have also 
been identified, demarcated, and detailed on 
the village plans (see Figure 2.1).
3. Regulation and registration of 
seasonal movements, protection 
of grazing areas and livestock 
corridors, and development of 
pastoral zones, water points, and 
cattle posts
Attempts have been made in some countries to 
reserve grazing areas through formal processes. 
In Niger, for example, a 1961 law established a 
boundary protecting the pastoral zone in the north 
from the burgeoning agricultural population 
in the south. However, the law has been poorly 
enforced, there is little coordinated effort to 
manage the pastoral lands, and agriculturalists 
have increasingly encroached into the area, 
resulting in conflicts and degradation of resources 
(Snorek 2011). Other examples, including “grazing 
reserves” in Nigeria and perimetres pastoraux in 
Burkina Faso, with different rules of management 
and access, have also failed to protect pastoral 
resources adequately. Not least, this is due to 
their imposed nature rather than building upon 
customary practices.
In Syria and Jordan, too, pastoral communities 
are said to contribute little to the management 
of the grazing reserves set up there, which are 
usually fenced. As a result, the main collective 
action of community members has been to 
hinder state licensing policies. This has led to 
conflicts between local and non-local herd 
owners. The approach has also been widely 
criticised because of the high costs of fencing 
and guarding reserves and the lack of community 
participation in improving and managing them 
(Ngaido and McCarthy 2005). 
Some greater success has been achieved 
in protecting migration routes. In Niger, the 
registering of land has provided some protection 
of livestock migration routes through more 
sedentarised communities. A similar process, 
using a combination of participatory and 
cadastre mapping in Cameroon, is described in 
IUCN 2011. The corresponding rights and duties 
are documented in a resolution that is signed by 
all stakeholders. This includes the obligation to 
keep pathways free from agricultural production, 
and the creation of surveillance committees to 
control its implementation. 
Physical signs or poles may be used to demarcate 
livestock corridors, but their merits are a matter 
of debate: though they might be expensive, 
supporters argue that such physical markers act 
as a visible reminder of pastoralist land rights 
and increase their security in the eyes of other 
land users. It has proved to be essential that 
basic services are provided along these routes, 
including water and grazing areas for resting. 
There is some disagreement amongst supporters 
as to whether management responsibility for 
them should lie principally with the users or 
with the government. Those who argue for the 
state holding responsibility suggest that this is 
more likely to avoid abuse by more powerful 
members in the community, which could lead to 
the breakdown of reciprocal relations between 
users (IIED and SOS Sahel 2010).
Other examples include schemes for providing 
licences and permits for moving livestock along 
defined routes (Tanzania: Maria Mashingo, 
personal communication 2010; Mongolia: 
Fernandez-Gimenez 2002) and to access grazing 
areas at certain times of the year (Burkina Faso: 
Hesse and Thébaud 2006; Cameroon: WISP and 
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ILC forthcoming; Syria and Jordan: Ngaido and 
McCarthy 2005; Lesotho: Turner 2009). However, 
opinion suggests that often these are perceived 
more as control mechanisms rather than as part of 
an integrated rangeland management approach.
4. Formalisation of locally developed 
agreements for resource sharing
Locally negotiated agreements or “conventions 
locales” between land users, through a process 
of stakeholder consultation and dialogue, are 
also becoming popular in West Africa (e.g. in 
Mali, Niger). Rules and regulations may include 
bushfire surveillance brigades, the marking out of 
livestock routes, fixing periods for harvesting wild 
fruits or for entering grazing lands, identifying 
quotas for resource use (fuel wood/timber), and 
protection of regenerating forests. Such measures 
are generally developed between cooperating 
groups and are not expensive in terms of financial 
investments, often being based on customary 
practices. However, if carried out properly, they 
can be time-consuming and need commitment 
and investment in reaching consensus though 
long negotiation processes. 
The local convention process can become 
more complex when competition over natural 
resources increases and conflicts have arisen, 
where diverse user groups are involved, and 
where those who do not reside permanently 
in the territory (e.g. urban-based or connected 
groups) also start using the resources. 
Conventions locales are usually signed by 
local government authorities to ensure their 
legitimacy and conformity with national laws. 
For example, in Senegal such agreements have 
been mainstreamed into national forestry law. 
However, some suggest that their status in some 
countries remains unstable (Hillhorst 2008). 
Governments may also take a facilitating role, 
in particular when a situation may be complex 
(such as those involving several different 
government administrative areas – for example, 
livestock corridors).
5. Recognition and formalisation 
of common property tenure
Many national land laws are making customary 
land tenure a fully legal and equivalent route 
through which land rights may be owned and 
transacted, and in some cases explicitly inclusive 
Box 2.2: Experience from Tanzania
Recently in Tanzania a number of acts have been passed that provide for the recognition and formalisation of village lands.1 
These acts cover both individual and common property land – the latter being managed under the authority of village 
councils. This legislation has conferred property rights on occupiers of customary land that are as secure as the property rights 
conferred on those holding land under granted (statutory) rights of occupancy (Adams and Turner undated). The Village 
Land Act requires villages to allocate lands between these individual and communal categories, zoning them for different 
purposes,2 as well as designating some lands as areas set aside (akiba), which will be allocated to the individual or communal 
areas at a later time. The Village Land Act thus provides a relatively secure tenure framework for communal land uses such as 
grazing pastures and forests, as well as specific requirements for basic land use planning and zoning (UCRT 2010).
1 Namely the Village Land Act No 5 (1999), the Land Use Planning Act No 6 (2007), and the Grazing and Land Animal Feed Resources Act No 13 (2010).
2 “Zoning” may mean different things to different people. Officials see it as a way of permanently demarcating or fencing off areas for exclusive use i.e. 
ordering complex landscapes into relatively simple and non-overlapping categories. Pastoralists tend to have a more flexible and integrated approach, 
reserving areas for particular use and managing them through conditions/rules of access, sometimes with physical demarcation occurring along a gradi-
ent of scarcity/importance (i.e. the more strategic/high-value an area is, the more likely there is to be a barrier of some sort) (UCRT 2010).
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Figure 2.2: An example of village land use planning in Tanzania
of properties that communities own and use in 
common (as in Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda, South 
Africa, Sudan, and Mozambique). Ten other 
countries have some less complete provision for 
security of local tenure of common properties 
(Benin, Namibia, Côte d’Ivoire, Botswana, Angola, 
Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Niger, Ethiopia, 
and Nigeria) (Alden Wily 2011). Many of these 
countries include substantial tracts of rangelands. 
Despite this, however, the examples of 
governments formalising customary rights on 
communal land for common property resources 
are few: rather, they still focus on individual rights. 
Exceptions are Namibia (where to date the focus 
has been on land for agriculture and settlement: 
Meijs and Kapitango 2010) and Tanzania, where 
land used for grazing is included within village 
land use planning processes.
In Tanzania, the process of delimiting and 
formalising village lands is now being carried out 
across the country (albeit slowly). Approximately 
600 villages (out of 12,000 in mainland Tanzania) 
have gone through the process. Of these, 266 
include the protection of grazing land, amounting 
to a total of 1.4 million hectares (Mashingo 
2010). Local by-laws provide the legal basis for 
the enforcement of plans. These are developed 
by the village assembly and the village council 
through community consultation. Capacity 
building of local governments, village councils, 
and local communities is an important part of 
NGO and government support in the process 
(this is discussed further later). Further details 
of the VLUP (village land use planning) process 
(summarised in Figure 2.2) can be found in UCRT 
(2010). 
Translation for land use zones key: 
Makazi na Kilimo = residence and 
agriculture (dwelling symbol); 
Mifugo – livestock (cow symbol); 
Hifadhi na Mifugo = conservation 
and livestock (cow and tree sym-
bols); 
Hifadhi na Matumizi ya Asili ya Wa-
hadzabe = traditional conservation 
zone (zebra and tree symbols).
(b) Land Use Planning Act 2007
Source: UCRT 2010
Figure 2.2: Formal steps in the land use planning process in Tanzania
(a) 1998 National Land Use Planning Commission guidelines
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(b) Land Use Planning Act 2007
Source: UCRT 2010
Figure 2.2: Formal steps in the land use planning process in Tanzania
(a) 1998 National Land Use Planning Commission guidelines
Increased role of 
rangeland users in 
decision-making 
processes
Governments have also sought to strengthen 
the role of rangeland users within land- and 
resource-related decision-making processes. 
This has been through:
1. Integration of customary institutions into 
government structures;
2. Institutionalising traditional methods of 
conflict management;
3. Including rangeland users in government 
decision-making processes;
4. Establishing new “representative” groups or 
committees; and
5. Support for the development of cooperatives 
for rangeland management.
1. Integration of customary 
institutions into government 
structures
An unusual but not unheard of arrangement is 
the formal integration of customary institutions 
into government or state structures – as found in 
Mongolia (Box 2.1). This sees customary leaders 
become government functionaries, albeit at the 
lowest level. Conflicts of interests have arisen 
as leaders inadequately represent community 
priorities whilst being part of government. 
2. Institutionalising traditional 
methods of conflict management 
A more common arrangement is one where 
local governments recognise and rely upon 
customary institutions to resolve local conflicts. 
Often such arrangements are supported and 
facilitated by development actors through, for 
example:
•	 The establishment of mixed land user 
committees, for example farmer-Fulani 
Dispute Resolution Committees in Nigeria 
(Mwangi and Dohrn 2006) or farmer-herder 
community dialogue platforms in Cameroon 
(Fon 2010);
•	 Paralegals who assist communities to 
understand and defend their rights, and to 
seek recourse within the courts (Tanzania: 
UCRT 2010; Cameroon: Fon 2010; Mali: IIED 
and SOS Sahel 2010);
•	 Mobile legal clinics and courts (Mali: IIED and 
SOS Sahel 2010); 
Box 2.2: Customary heads as government functionaries
Bulgan Cum is a district in the province of Xovd, Republic of Mongolia, close to the Chinese border. The district “centre”, the 
town of Bulgan, serves as the point of contact between nomads and state structures. The district is divided into bag (or 
“brigades”), two of which comprise the town itself, while the rest carve up the nomads roughly along ethnic and clan lines. 
The bag are territorial units, in a sense, but the different lands need not be contiguous, as some of the nomads migrate far 
to their summer pastures, traversing territory belonging to other clans. The chiefs of the nomadic bag are elected by the 
community and migrate together with the rest. The bag is in this sense a mobile social unit, whose minimal administration 
(in addition to the bag chief, there is a forestry chief and a vet—all nomads) travels with it. Nevertheless, the bag chief is a 
member of the state structure, a government functionary – although at the lowest level – and he answers directly to the 
elected bosses in the district centre (Gil-White 2003). 
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•	 Development of community-based 
savings, credit, and insurance schemes to 
compensate herders for loss of livestock to 
wildlife (Nepal: Karky and Cushing 2002);
•	 Institutionalising peace and development 
committees that have been set up by 
pastoral women (Kenya: Birch and Shuria 
2002); and
•	 Supporting peace forums (Horn of Africa/
East Africa: Nori et al. undated).
However, where governments and other actors 
completely withdraw from conflict resolution and 
where there is a lack of customary law and order 
(or customary law and order is unable to cope 
with increasing conflicts), some communities 
have been left highly vulnerable. In this situation 
they have little option other than to purchase 
weapons and ammunition to defend their 
animals, property, and families – as in Karamoja, 
Uganda where commercial raiding of livestock 
has increased dramatically (Stites et al. 2007).
3. Including rangeland users in 
government decision-making 
processes
In recent years a greater number of educated 
pastoralists (or at least people of pastoral 
descent), have taken up positions in government, 
including within national governments. There 
may also be specific ministries, such as the 
Ministry of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands, 
or committees such as the Pastoralist Standing 
Committee in Ethiopia, that focus on pastoral 
areas and peoples. Decentralisation processes 
can aid the development of regional polices and 
laws that better reflect pastoral needs. However, 
they can also be co-opted by more powerful 
actors to further their own interests. 
Pastoralists may also be invited by government 
to take part in decision-making bodies at local 
government levels. In Namibia, for example, 
Communal Land Boards (CLBs) and traditional 
authorities administer and allocate land 
rights on communal land. Customary leaders 
define customary rights, which are approved/
formalised by the CLB. CLBs undertake the 
allocation of leasehold rights. Currently, the 
registration process is focusing on land used 
for subsistence agriculture and settlement, but 
it also has potential for areas used for mobile 
livestock production (Meijs and Kapitango 2010). 
Although many governments talk about a 
high level of “participation” and “inclusion” 
of communities, in reality this rarely occurs. 
Many members of local government have no 
experience of conducting participatory planning 
processes, and many of the tools that they are 
trained to use do not explicitly address issues 
of equity or the fact that rural communities are 
often highly differentiated. Local government 
may be dominated or highly influenced by local 
elites pursuing their own short-term political and 
economic agendas (Hesse and Thébaud 2006: 20). 
This can compromise the inclusion of the voice of 
pastoralists, which they should be representing.
4. Establishing new 
“representative” groups or 
committees 
Alternatively, new associations, committees, 
or groups that include traditional leaders may 
be established in the processes of formalising 
customary land use. Examples include 
Communal Land Associations in Karamajong, 
Uganda, which are accorded rights to use and 
manage the resource base (Fuys et al 2008; 
IUCN 2011), and agro-pastoral Consultative 
Commissions in Cameroon and Niger (discussed 
in more detail in Section 5).
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New organisations can also be set up to administer 
certain aspects of natural resource management 
or development, such as a community fund. These 
can act as a communication link between higher 
levels of authority and communities, presenting 
the concerns of communities to government and 
resolving conflicts between higher authorities 
and communities (e.g. Pastoralist Council, 
Ngorongoro, Tanzania: Kipuri and Sorensen 
2008). However, it can often be difficult for these 
organisations to remain independent and it is 
likely that they will end up being more strongly 
linked with, and biased towards, one or other 
political party.
5. Support for development of 
cooperatives
Numerous projects have attempted to reorganise 
pastoralists into cooperatives, with the aims of 
improving rangeland resources, stimulating 
business development, and promoting 
collective action. But cooperatives have rarely 
been effective managers of rangelands. In 
theory, the state and local organisations could 
work together to create and enforce rules and 
investment activities, but in practice the costs 
of negotiating such rules have often been 
prohibitive (Ngaido and McCarthy 2005).
However, there are positive examples. In most 
West Asian countries, pastoral cooperatives 
have been involved in distributing subsidised 
animal feeds. In Jordan, new herder-driven 
cooperatives, which have management rights 
granted by the state over their traditional 
pastures, are getting better range productivity 
results than state-managed reserves, without 
the need for expensive fencing and guarding. 
This type of cooperative fosters collective action 
between members because members are 
certain to reap the benefits of their investments 
and control access to improved pastures. There 
remain, however, concerns about potential 
conflicts between cooperative members and 
non-members. Sustainability is also proving to 
be a challenge: in the Sahel, for example, most of 
the cooperative arrangements for membership 
grazing on common pastures have broken 
down at the end of the project/programme 
periods (Ngaido and McCarthy 2005).
Limitations of these 
initiatives and 
approaches
Although these relatively new initiatives and 
approaches are a positive step towards the 
securing of rights to resources, including land 
for rangeland users, they fail to fully do so, being 
limited by a number of factors. 
1. There has been a separation 
of land use planning from local 
development
Despite the rhetoric of participation, land use 
planning is still being carried out in a top-
down, technocratic, sectoral, and “one size fits 
all” fashion. A key objective of much land use 
planning is to tidy up the perceived “messy” and 
“fuzzy” nature of customary tenure and property 
rights into a more technical and orderly system. 
Many land use planning and land tenure 
interventions are not included in or built upon 
the long-term vision or strategies of land users. 
Rarely are the specific needs and dynamics 
of local users, their institutions (including 
levels of authority, perceptions, trust, access to 
information), behaviour, interests, or priorities 
considered. Likewise, external and internal 
factors that may influence the success of land 
use planning and its implementation, including 
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management of resources and the demand and 
supply of goods and services derived from the 
resource system, are not taken into account. 
Land use planning is seen as an end rather 
than a means. And governments rely on CSOs 
and NGOs to help communities react to land 
use planning rather than steer the process, and 
to adapt their livelihood systems to land use 
planning rather than the other way round.
As a result, not only might such interventions 
conflict with the different priorities of land users, 
but there is also less incentive for land users to 
invest in the enforcement of and to comply with 
new regulations or institutions, as they have little 
feeling of ownership or control over them: they 
are simply imposed. 
The delinking of land use planning from 
development has also contributed to sectoral 
divisions within governments. A plethora of 
sectoral laws on forestry, water, land, and the 
environment are designed and implemented 
by different line ministries, all of which have a 
bearing on rangeland management. This creates 
misunderstandings, competition, and conflict 
between government institutions, the effects of 
which are felt most acutely by local people. 
2. Limited role of land users in 
decision-making processes
Under the schemes and initiatives described 
above, land users tend to be given only a limited 
role in planning, management, and investment 
decisions and an even smaller role in deciding 
on the evolution of property rights. Even where 
citizens are invited to participate, insufficient 
attention is paid to creating the conditions for 
this to happen effectively. Often such citizens 
lack the necessary knowledge, skills and capacity 
to effectively voice their concerns and influence 
decision-making processes.
Not only is the process rather mechanical 
and driven by central concerns with very 
short deadlines, but citizens themselves 
lack the skills to debate the issues and 
provide alternative policy options backed 
by strong arguments. Furthermore, even if 
citizens are able to provide strong evidence-
based arguments, these are not necessarily 
sufficient to ensure appropriate policies. 
(Mali and Niger: Hesse and Thébaud 2006: 19)
As a result, policies and implementation fail 
to reflect land users priorities. They also fail to 
provide land users with the authority or power 
they require to carry out effective rangeland 
management. Often users do not have the 
right to reallocate common land to alternative 
activities such as cropping or reserves, so limiting 
their ability to respond to changes in local 
conditions. Land use conflicts have been fostered 
and collective action has broken down. Often 
rangeland degradation has followed. Where 
communities do play a greater role (such as in 
Tanzania) concerns are raised about the capacity 
of local groups to enforce rules governing use 
and access of resources, particularly in relation 
to more powerful actors (Tanzania: UCRT 2010).
Too often, participatory processes are used 
by development projects to seek community 
endorsement for the activities for which they 
have funding. Tools are needed that allow 




3. Abuse, corruption, and loss 
of credibility of government 
authorities
Though governments may support 
decentralisation of authority on paper, in reality 
this rarely happens. Rather, deconcentration 
tends to be the result of extending responsibilities 
to lower levels of government without devolving 
power and providing needed financial and 
human resources and guidelines. Where 
decentralisation does occur, it is no guarantee 
of good governance (Hesse and Trench 2000). 
Land committees or associations dominated 
by civil servants and with token representation 
of land users are likely to be biased and prone 
to corruption, such as imposing illicit taxes 
for livestock passage, charging fees for using 
public water points (West Africa: Cotula 2006), or 
demanding bribes to allow pastoralists to graze 
on village lands (Tanzania: UCRT 2010). 
Such inefficiency on the part of public 
institutions (a gap that is partially filled by CSOs 
and NGOs) creates obstacles to the realisation 
of development objectives and reduces the 
credibility of public administration in the eyes 
of civil society and, in turn, its potential positive 
impacts (FAO 2005).
Formalisation and registration processes often 
prove unfair and inequitable, being open to 
manipulation, corruption, and exclusion by 
those with more power, particularly if land users 
are not physically present (Lavigne-Delville 
2010; Ngaido and McCarthy 2005). In many 
cases, people with previous customary claims 
(primary and secondary) to resources have 
been dispossessed and/or denied future access, 
without compensation.
4. Systems restrict mobility and 
adaptation to crisis or change, so 
increasing vulnerability
Land tenure systems that have supported the 
registration of individual land holdings have 
promoted sedentarisation and fragmentation of 
the rangeland and have encouraged the growth 
of agro-pastoralism and/or agriculture (Flintan 
2011b). The impacts of this individualisation 
and privatisation of the rangelands have in 
general proved to be negative for the majority 
of rangeland users: socially, economically, and 
environmentally increasing their vulnerability 
and their ability to overcome the impacts of 
drought and predicted climate change (Mwangi 
and Dohrn 2006; Flintan 2011b).
Protection has not been provided to secondary 
or tertiary users of land and resources, and in 
many cases their rights have been completely 
lost. Even within the more progressive policies 
(such as in Tanzania), livestock mobility is 
restricted through an increase in fences, 
enclosures, and conflicting boundaries, and the 
further removal of land for uses such as fodder 
and crop production. Land tenure policies tend 
to demand occupation and cultivation of land to 
ensure “ownership” or long-term use: this makes 
it difficult for pastoralists to be absent from the 
land for long periods of time and to practise 
their migrations.
As a result, in times of crisis and change, such as 
drought, pastoralists are prevented from moving 
to use alternative resources, and this has greatly 
increased their vulnerability and the likelihood 
of greater livestock (asset) loss (Uganda: 
Kisamba-Mugerwa et al. 2006; West Africa: Hesse 
and Thébaud 2006). In addition, loopholes 
combined with poor and unjust procedures still 
leave the commons more vulnerable than land 
for settlement or farming to appropriation by 
governments (Alden Wily 2011). Increasingly, 
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commercial investors focus on these commons 
as the overall amount of “available” or “free” land 
and resources decreases. As their value increases, 
so too does demand for them.
These changes have also had an impact on 
social systems and institutions. As individual 
values have increased, collective action and 
reciprocity have diminished. Customary 
institutions and practices have broken down. 
Consequently, pastoralist households are even 
more vulnerable to drought and other crises 
(Ngaido and McCarthy 2005). Hunter-gatherer 
communities who depend upon cooperating 
with one another for their survival are facing 
similar problems (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004).
5. Increased conflicts
Conflicts have increased, triggered by increased 
competition over a reduced resource base, 
amongst other factors (Africa: Nori et al. undated; 
East Africa: Ngaido and McCarthy 2005; Sudan: 
Pantuliano et al. 2009; Afghanistan and Sudan: 
Alden Wily 2009, 2010 (see Box 2.2). As Liz Alden 
Wily (2008b: 10) suggests:
If we cast our eyes around the 71 conflicts in 
the world today, we see that not only are the 
majority of these conflicts intra-state affairs 
(85%) but that two-thirds are driven by contested 
claims to land. Mostly this is a territorial sense 
and often has some roots in unjust treatment of 
customary occupation as legal tenure.
Areas of high value (such as those with high 
agricultural potential, minerals or wildlife 
conservation value) (Mwangi and Dohrn 2006) 
or “rangeland productivity hotspots” (e.g. dry-
season grazing areas such as wetlands) (Flintan 
and Cullis 2010) may be the most sought after 
and contested areas. As such it is not necessarily 
resource scarcity that causes conflict, but also 
competition over resource-rich areas (Lind and 
Sturman 2002).
There are a greater number of conflicts 
over boundaries of individual holders than 
within communal property systems, though 
individualisation does tend to reduce ownership 
disputes (Uganda: Kisamba-Mugerwa et al. 
2006). Further, conflicts continue in many 
areas despite the implementation of land use 
planning that recognises common property: 
local by-laws and land use plans are ignored or 
contravened. In Loliondo, Tanzania, for example, 
violent clashes between different land users 
”“
Box 2.2: Undermined livelihoods, resource access rights, and conflict in Darfur
Land and resource access in pastoral areas is a critical element in understanding the 2004–2005 crisis in Darfur, which displaced 
an estimated 2 million people and killed another 70,000. Reform of land rights in the 1970s to encourage agricultural export 
production undermined livelihoods by creating structural land scarcities. Environmental degradation, reduced availability of 
resources, and the limited use of southern Sudanese pastures due to war forced nomadic herder communities into farming 
areas, which led to conflict with settled agrarian groups. The region also suffered several cycles of drought, which reduced 
the size of herds and destroyed crops, accelerating migration from rural areas to urban centres. Government response was 
inadequate both to longer-term concerns and to the increasing crisis, offering few benefits to farmers and herders. The 
explosive combination of diminishing livelihoods, governance failures, and continued conflict elsewhere in the country 
helped to stoke violence (Egemi and Pantuliano 2004 in Nori et al. undated).
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have taken place on a regular basis despite the 
fact that land use plans were drawn up in the 
villages involved ten years ago. The conflicts 
are blamed on inappropriate and non-inclusive 
land use planning processes that have failed 
to fully address the core problems in the area. 
This highlights the need for a) an inclusive and 
consensus-building land use planning process; 
and b) the importance of ongoing engagement 
with political and policy processes if local 
planning initiatives are to have their intended 
impact (Tanzania: UCRT 2010; Baha et al. 2008).
6. Increased rangeland 
degradation leading to loss of 
productivity
A common argument amongst supporters 
of individual land titling is that it will result in 
increased investments in land conservation 
measures and will improve productivity. A 
report by Flintan (2011a) for ILC disputes this 
assumption and suggests that the situation is 
much more complex than previously suggested. 
The individualisation processes that followed 
the setting up of group ranches in Kenya, for 
example, clearly show negative impacts on 
pastoralists and pastoral systems and in particular 
on poorer members of pastoral society. In many 
cases, the resulting competition for resources 
and a breakdown of customary institutions 
has led to rangeland degradation and a loss 
of livestock productivity, if not complete loss 
during droughts as mobility has been restricted 
(Flintan 2011b). 
Indeed, many of the constraints listed above 
have led to rangeland degradation, as additional 
pressures have been placed on the now smaller 
pool of resources. Further, a reduction in collective 
action has reduced the likelihood of community 
stewardship and there are fewer incentives for 
members to manage their resources effectively 
or to make long-term investments. Competing 
claims between pastoral communities and 
states have created situations of confusion 
and open access, leading many pastoralists 
to challenge both state and traditional range 
management rules and activities and, in some 
cases, to appropriate common lands (East Africa: 
Ngaido and McCarthy 2005; Namibia: Atkinson 
et al. 2006)
Interventions that have taken place have 
concentrated on resident populations (such as 
the gestion de terroir described above) and have 
failed to develop resource tenures systems that 
fulfil the needs of more mobile people. 
Evidence from Afghanistan, where a community 
pasture management programme is being 
promoted, shows that recognition of community 
rights is the single most important trigger to a 
community taking action to regulate its resource 
(Alden Wily 2008b). Indeed, in Tanzania the 
completion of participatory land use planning 
has been directly linked to improvements in 
the natural resources base, including a recovery 
of local wildlife populations in hunter-gatherer 
and pastoral lands (UCRT 2010). Yet this is not 
the case throughout the country; for example, 
where priorities for conservation exist over local 
community development (as in conservation 
areas such as Ngorongoro), the marginalisation 
of customary institutions and local communities 
has led directly to a) increased environmental 
degradation and wild animal loss; and b) 
increased poverty (Ngorongoro Crater, Tanzania: 
Kipuri and Sorensen 2008).
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7. Tenure pluralism without 
clear guidance, frameworks, or 
protection
As a result of the different interventions that 
have taken place in rangelands, a situation of 
tenure pluralism now exists where customary 
and statutory land tenure systems for the 
same resource overlap. Potentially there may 
be other systems too, where rights have been 
established through NGOs, conservation 
authorities, and the like. 
This has led to contradictory rules and competing 
authorities providing de jure or de facto rights 
to the same land and resources. Through 
this “legal pluralism”, the neat distinction 
between the different tenure systems has been 
considerably blurred. “Customary” systems have 
changed and statutory systems usually operate 
with considerable possibilities for negotiation 
or even rejection. 
As a result, resource users tend to gain access 
to natural resources through a blend of 
customary and statutory arrangements and 
institutions and/or choose the institutional 
channel that is most likely to favour their cause 
(“forum shopping”), though typically actors 
prefer one or the other (Cotula 2006). This can 
be advantageous to some parties, but others – 
and in particular the less powerful – are likely 
to be marginalised. There can be competition 
between arbitration bodies, leading to conflicts 
and land grabbing (Lavigne-Delville 2010). The 
situation is not sustainable and does not provide 
the majority of rangeland users with sufficient 
protection over the resources that they require 
for their livelihoods. 
With a very few exceptions, customary land 
tenure systems are not offered the same security 
and protection by the government as statutory 
systems, and until this changes they will always 
be more vulnerable. Indeed, the large number 
of incidences of land evictions, appropriations, 
and other losses or conflicts found within the 
rangelands today is evidence of this.
Where to next?
It is generally agreed that, as a matter of 
urgency, pastoralists and other rangeland 
users need greater protection and security 
for their lands and resources, supported by 
effective legal measures (Sayer 2009; Niamir-
Fuller 2005; Mwangi and Dohrn 2006). How 
best this can be achieved is still unclear. 
However, what is clear is that policy-makers’ 
attention should focus on ways to enhance 
the security and effectiveness of property 
rights under the pluralistic arrangements 
that currently exist (Adams and Turner 2005). 
As such, the benefits of different land tenure 
regimes should be considered for different 
land uses and needs of land users, and the 
most appropriate should be provided with 
the same level of security and protection. 
The following three sections consider how 
this might be better supported. 
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It has become clear that, though progress has 
indeed been made in land use planning and 
the recognition of customary tenure (and more 
rarely its formalisation) is taking place, there 
are still fundamental gaps and failings of the 
systems and approaches being implemented 
and, in many cases, the policies and regulations 
supporting them. 
Such failings tend to be in two key areas:
1. In the development of land use and tenure 
systems that provide for an understanding 
of, accounting for, and protection of the 
complexities (spatial, temporal, institutional) 
of customary common property systems, 
particularly those that exist in multi-use 
landscapes such as rangelands, where local 
development and livelihoods rely on the 
tracking of rangeland resources across a 
domain or territory; and
2. In the establishment of an effective 
governance system that recognises and 
accounts for different power relations, 
capacities, and needs/interests, and that 
provides local users with appropriate 
tools and mechanisms for protecting their 
resources and land from more powerful 
stakeholders. 
How then can these constraints and challenges 
be overcome? How can the many different 
local land management and rights systems be 
incorporated within a framework that is not 
top-heavy and too cumbersome or costly to 
use? Does it require a new system, approach, or 
indeed way of thinking to be developed, or can 
the answer be found in better implementation 
of and building on the opportunities of tenure 
and land use systems that already exist? How 
can “sound governance” be achieved?
This section and the one following look at the 
key features required for more appropriate 
land and resource tenure policy and practice 
in rangelands. “New”, “alternative”, and/or 
“improved” approaches and processes are 
described here; tools used in these processes 
are described in the following section; and the 
issues of governance and structure are discussed 
in Section 5.
Approaches and Processes: Multi-
land use planning and securing 
of resources in rangelands
3
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Formalising tenure at 
a more appropriate 




It is generally agreed that in order to secure 
rights to rangeland resources and to maintain 
necessary mobility, initiatives must work at the 
appropriate scale and according to the logic of 
the rangeland (and, for example, the pastoral) 
system. Land use problems do not exist in 
isolation and are strongly influenced by internal 
and external forces. “Thinking big” and working 
at scale can help to overcome this. It requires a 
systems approach that takes into account the 
fact that changing one part will impact on other 
parts, as well as the system as a whole. A number 
of approaches have been developed with these 
points in mind; a comparative summary of them 
is provided in Appendix 1.
1. Rangeland co-management
The concept of “co-management” and the power 
sharing involved are discussed extensively 
in Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2004). Co-
management provides a clear framework and 
process that encourage the central participation 
of local communities, power sharing between 
stakeholders and institutions, and the 
development of more appropriate mechanisms 
for managing resources (including rights, roles, 
responsibilities, and revenues). 
This approach has increasingly been promoted 
within community-based natural resource 
management, where conservation organisations 
have for many years advocated a “landscape” 
approach to land use planning and resource 
management7 (Sayer 2009 and see, for example, 
WWF and IUCN’s “Landscape Approach” – 
WWF/IUCN 2002). Most recently, this has 
developed into support for Indigenous and 
Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs; in Australia 
called IPAs); see, for example, PAFID 2010, 
http://www.iccaforum.org, or special edition of 
Parks, Volume 16, 2008; also Box 3.1).
7  A landscape can be defined as “a contiguous area, inter-
mediate in size between an ‘ecoregion’ and a ‘site’, with 
a specific set of ecological, cultural and socioeconomic 
characteristics distinct from its neighbours”. It is impor-
tant to emphasise that it is the set that is distinctive, not 
any single characteristic (Maginnis et al. 2004: 331).
Box 3.1: Indigenous protected areas in Australia
In the mid-1990s the Australian government launched a programme to support indigenous landholders to voluntarily declare 
and manage their land as indigenous protected areas (IPAs). IPAs can be established as formal conservation agreements 
under state or territory legislation, or under Indigenous Law. Aboriginal land-owners have a variety of legal mechanisms 
to control activities on their land, including local by-laws and privacy laws. The process of establishing an IPA is entirely 
voluntary, and Aboriginal people can choose the level of government involvement, the level of visitor access (if any), and 
the extent of development to meet their needs. In return for government assistance, the Aboriginal owners of IPAs are 
required to develop a management plan and to make a commitment to manage their land (and/or waters and resources) 
with the goal of conserving its biodiversity values. There are now over 20 IPAs across Australia. Further details are available on: 
http://www.deh.gov.au/indigenous.ipa (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004; Smyth 2001).
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Increasingly, this approach is being developed in 
rangelands, including in Kenya (Okello et al. 2003; 
Bassi 2008) and Iran (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
2004). In Mongolia, provisions such as pastoralist 
group leases (discussed in more detail below) 
are being developed within discussions around 
a greater process of co-management. 
Many CCAs include forests, which are being 
managed by local communities. Programmes 
such as joint forest management (JFM) or 
participatory forest management (PFM) have 
provided the structure for a formalisation of 
customary rights to many forests and the 
development of better management systems. 
Examples of PFM and JFM can be found across 
the world. Many of these forests border or are part 
of rangelands and dryland landscapes. Amongst 
others, examples can be found in Niger (Amadou 
et al. 2003), Ethiopia (Boku Tache and Irwin 2003), 
and India (Mitul 2011; Banikanta and Birendra 
Kumar 2011). Important lessons can be learned 
from the development of CCAs, JFM, and PFM, 
including the lack of power sharing conceded 
by more powerful actors to local communities 
within what generally remains predominantly 
a top-down approach. In addition, continued 
problems with enforcement of local by-laws 
and regulations due to a lack of empowerment 
of communities and legal sanctions (Ben Irwin, 
personal communication 2011 and others). 
2. Participatory rangeland 
management/community-based 
pasture management
Indeed, looking to the lessons learnt from 
PFM in Ethiopia in particular, where this has 
been accepted as a useful process for better 
management of community forests, a process 
Figure 3.1: Key steps in participatory rangeland management (PRM)
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of “participatory rangeland management” or 
PRM has been developed. It has been suggested 
that applying the same principles of forest 
management to the rangelands as a whole 
(i.e. beyond solely forests) may be the right 
step forward to securing rights to resources for 
rangeland users. As a result, Save the Children 
USA and FAO, with the support of a national 
Natural Resource Management (NRM) Technical 
Working Group, developed a set of Introductory 
Guidelines to the approach in 2010 (Flintan and 
Cullis 2010), and these are now being developed 
for piloting. Formalisation is provided through a 
rangeland management agreement between 
community and local government and the 
development of by-laws. 
In Afghanistan a similar approach is already 
being piloted. Called “community-based pasture 
management” (CBPM), it focuses specifically 
on the owner-management of pastures within 
rangelands, including making clear distinctions 
between private, community, and public 
pastures (see Box 3.2). Supported by recent 
policies and legislation, FAO has been working 
with communities since 2006 to explore options 
for community-based management. This 
has included developing a process of CBPM, 
guidelines for which are found in Alden Wily 
2008a and which are summarised in Appendix 
1. Similar attempts include the introduction 
of “managed resource areas” and grazing 
associations in Lesotho (Turner 2009).
3. Community development 
planning
Increasingly, it is being recognised that the 
management of rangeland resources needs to 
be embedded within development strategies 
and local community planning processes. 
This is particularly relevant for communities 
who depend to a high degree on rangeland 
resources for their livelihoods. In addition, local 
and national governments need to work in a 
more integrated and holistic way, in order to 
avoid conflicting policies being developed by 
different departments and negative impacts 
occurring in one part of a rangeland system 
resulting from actions/processes carried out in 
another (as discussed in Section 2).
This thinking has formed the basis of a push for 
the development of “community development 
plans” linked to the management of natural 
resources (which often commences with their 
mapping – see below). In the Maghreb countries 
of northern Africa, ICARDA and IFAD have 
taken this process one step further and have 
developed a process and a manual to guide the 
development of community development plans 
in the region (Nefzaoui et al. 2007). The process, 
as with many of the approaches described here, 
works through a process of learning, planning, 
institutional development, and implementation 
(see Appendix 1).
Box 3.2: Community-based pasture management (CBPM) in Afghanistan
In Afghanistan FAO has been supporting the development of CBPM. The founding strategy of the initiative is to use CBPM as 
the trigger for systematically resolving inter-community disputes among settled communities regarding ownership and control 
of local pastures. With assistance from a local NGO, Solidarities, the project has worked with around 70 communities in three 
districts and has brought around 100,000 hectares of “community pastures” under working community management, while 
reducing the number of conflicts over access to resources. The results of the project encouraged the government to restart rural 
land registration along lines similar to community-based registration, including communal pastoral assets (Alden Wily 2008a).
41
4. Participatory and negotiated 
territorial development
Participatory and negotiated territorial 
development (PNTD) is a process developed 
by FAO (2002; Hatcher 2009), which results “in 
concrete answers to the challenges of improving 
trust among social actors, strengthening social 
cohesion and promoting a systemic territorial 
development” through:
•	 Building credibility between public and 
private actors;
•	 Strengthening social cohesion to improve 
local resource use and management through 
a territorial approach;
•	 Conceiving the territory as an arena for 
dialogue and negotiation (for more details, 
see Appendix 1).
Dialogue and negotiation form the central 
component of the process. It is seen as an 
empowering approach, fostering bottom-up 
decision-making and collaboration between 
different actors, built on trust and the finding of 
common ground and workable solutions. 
The “territory” is believed to be a more appropriate 
unit to deal with land issues as it offers a 
better view of social-political and ecological 
functionings, enables vertical and horizontal 
integration, facilitates the development of 
synergies while taking into account linkages 
with other levels, and helps to revitalise/involve 
formerly marginalised areas. It provides a space 
for different actors with conflicting interests to 
negotiate their positions, interests, and needs.
The social territorial agreement which 
results from the process can include (among 
other things), conflict resolution, a territorial 
development plan, the delimitation of territorial 
boundaries taking into account customary 
rights, or new land tenure laws. The agreement 
reached as a result of the negotiation process 
should define all the prerequisites (e.g. human, 
physical, social, and financial resources), the 
instruments, and the roles and responsibilities 
required for its implementation.
In Angola, components of PTND were used with 
FAO’s “participatory land delimitation” approach 
to support the delimitation and formalisation of 
San customary rights to 1,389 hectares of their 
land (Cenerini 2008). PTND components have 
also been used extensively in Latin America. 
However, the complete process is yet to be fully 
tested and used. 
5. Communal domains or 
customary land areas
Liz Alden Wily (2005a) also highlights territory, 
or more specifically “communal domains”, as a 
unit where customary tenure exists but requires 
strengthening and formalisation of rights. The 
first step is defining and/or clarifying a customary 
domain wherein customary law thereafter 
definitively and legally applies. This provides 
better but not foolproof blanket protection 
to the diverse range of individual and shared 
rights that exist within that domain. Integral 
to this process must be the establishment 
of the institutional basis for the regulation of 
customary rights within the domain (discussed 
in more detail in Sections 4 and 5).
With these critical foundations in place, attention 
should then turn to the common properties 
within those domains which remain at most 
risk of loss to their shareholders. Transparent 
and accountable mechanisms through which 
community-derived rights are identified, secured, 
sustained, regulated, and managed need to be 
developed. This is likely to be through customary 
laws and institutions, but statutory provision is 
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also needed, for example to establish county-/
district-level registers of customary domains, to 
recognise customary land interests as private 
property rights, and to recognise community-
derived/elected land administration bodies as 
the legal local land authorities. Rights then need 
to be formally recorded and legally entrenched 
(through registration). The process needs to 
be completely accessible and simple for mass 
uptake and benefit i.e. beyond or in addition to 
cadastral-based registration systems (Alden Wily 
2005a).
This approach has been modified for Sudan and 
Afghanistan. In Sudan the process results in a 
“Customary Land Area” (CLA), which could be 
based on a village or set of villages, or a tribal 
area. A Community Land Council is elected by 
the community to manage the area and, for 
example, negotiate access for secondary users 
such as nomads. Detailed guidelines have been 
developed (Alden Wily 2005b).
Key characteristics of 
these approaches
Though these different approaches vary in 
name and details, they also have a number of 
similar underlying foundation blocks and key 
characteristics. These include the following:
1. Understanding/learning and/
or identifying problems through 
land users
The first step in all the above approaches 
is understanding and learning about the 
customary and other tenure systems that 
exist, and how they function. This will include 
understanding how these have changed over 
time and why.
A rangeland is likely to both include government 
administrative units (such as villages) and also 
be part of them (such as districts or regions). 
It is likely that statutory tenure systems will 
exist in and around villages where individual 
or (in the case of Tanzania) customary rights 
have already been formalised. Non-formalised 
customary systems over resource access, use, 
and “ownership” will also exist. Boundaries 
across a rangeland are likely to be open and 
fuzzy, with people, livestock, and wild animals 
moving within the outer borders and beyond 
into neighbouring rangelands. Though such 
boundaries may be challenging to identify, if a 
particular land/resource area is to be protected 
then the boundary of the area will need to be 
defined. Thus ways to do this will have to be 
identified with rangeland users. 
Land can be categorised in different ways, 
including by altitude; by types of resource 
e.g. water, grassland, minerals; by types of 
vegetation; by use e.g. wet-season grazing; by 
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distance from a settlement; by management; 
or by a combination of these reflected in the 
socio-geographical distribution of people 
and their livelihood/social systems (based 
on different land and resource use) (see, for 
example, Guitton et al. 2008). The Maasai in 
Tanzania classify land according to different 
criteria, which have important implications for 
rangeland management (see Box 3.3). Different 
actors will be involved with different areas of 
land and resource types. All these complexities 
and their dynamics will need to be understood 
and defined before decisions can be made as to 
what tenure and rights need to be strengthened, 
where, and for whom.
It is likely that through the process of defining 
resources and existing tenure systems, problems 
and challenges in terms of access, management, 
and “ownership” will also be identified. 
Identification of problems can be made more 
structured through targeted activities, such as 
using participatory rural appraisal (PRA) tools, 
or may arise through general discussion. These 
problems and challenges will be a central 
influence on defining ways forward, including 
solutions. 
Mapping
A valuable tool in this learning stage has proved 
to be community resource (and other) mapping. 
Community maps in particular have the ability 
(if facilitated and drawn well) to highlight not 
only resource distribution and access/property 
regimes, but also the dynamics and complexities 
of resource use and management and the 
movement of resources across a rangeland.
Rangeland resource mapping converts 
information that many rangeland users hold 
only in their minds into written form. It can be 
used for initiating discussions, for negotiation, 
management, or tenure securing processes. 
The mapping process itself can prove 
empowering and can increase the “ownership” 
that communities have over tenure processes 
(Nicaragua, Philippines, Madagascar: Di Gessa 
2008; Ethiopia: Rowley and Mulugeta Terfa 2008; 
Flintan 2010).
Community mapping is being increasingly 
accepted when defining landholdings within 
statutory tenure processes, including in 
Madagascar (HARDI 2010), the Philippines (PAFID 
2010), Kyrgyzstan (IUCN 2011), Cameroon (WISP 
and ILC forthcoming), Tanzania (UCRT 2010), and 
Mozambique (see Box 3.4). There are also attempts 
to map larger territories or rangelands that provide 
Box 3.3: Maasai land classification systems
In northern Tanzania, Maasai herders classify seasonally grazed landscapes using socio-cultural folk systems, soils, topography 
and vegetation, management knowledge, and seasons of grazing. Herders characterise grazing lands as degradable (orpora) 
or non-degradable (orkojita) with reference to soils (ngulupo) and vegetation type. This categorisation is used for regulating 
seasonal grazing across diverse landscapes. According to herders, degradation occurs in the Selela landscapes when traditional 
grazing systems are altered by crop cultivation. The disappearance of key forage species and an increase in species less 
desired by livestock are used as indicators of degradation. The overall effect of land degradation is inferred from a decline in 
livestock productivity. The evidence suggests that descriptions of landscape degradation in terms of loss of grazing value for 
a particular livestock species might be more relevant than a general statement about rangeland degradation associated with 
pastoral land use. According to these findings, land use planners could incorporate herder knowledge with scientific methods 
to test the impact of management and promote community participation in rangeland monitoring (Oba and Kaitira 2006).
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a fuller picture of resource use, management, 
etc. One example has been the work of SOS 
Sahel Ethiopia and Save the Children USA, which 
facilitated the mapping of traditional grazing 
units, or dheeda, with Borana pastoralists living 
in the southern part of Ethiopia. Documented in 
Boku Tache’s report (2009), the process covered 
two dheeda and 55 villages across five districts. 
The maps were highly detailed and showed the 
extent of encroachment by settlements and crop 
farming, also used in Tanzania as the cover photo 
illustrates.  
Increasingly, too, geographical information 
system (GIS) technology is being used to digitise 
community maps, including mobility routes and 
multi-use rangeland systems (see examples in 
Flintan 2010 showing the digitisation of Borana 
dheeda maps) and to show the different layers 
of production and social values of communities 
across a landscape (Tanzania: Fagerholm and 
Kayhko 2009). Such systems have also been 
used to increase understanding of the factors 
and forces influencing rangeland use and to 
identify options for land/resource tenure and 
land/resource use planning and management 
(Kenya: Mulianga 2009). Some organisations 
have also explored the use of high-resolution 
satellite images (e.g. 1: 25,000 scale) as the 
starting point for discussions on resources and 
land use. Communities’ interpretation of natural 
cartography has been shown to be consistent, 
accurate, and time-saving, and people can easily 
relate their local knowledge to the satellite 
images on paper (Ethiopia: Flintan 2010). Finally, 
3D modelling can be a useful and more “realistic” 
alternative to mapping flat on paper and has 
been used successfully for community landscape 
and watershed planning and management (Di 
Gessa 2008; DENR 2000).
In all cases, communities should be able to have 
“ownership” over their map and control its access 
and use. It should be remembered that maps 
are a powerful document that can be used to 
disadvantage indigenous groups, as well as 
benefit them (Harris and Hazen 2006).
Formalised “community consultations”
In some countries, such as Mozambique, 
legislation and instruments are in place that 
oblige investors to determine if the land being 
requested is “free from occupation” (see Box 
3.4). However, loopholes in the law still leave 
commons vulnerable (Alden Wily 2011).
Examples have also been provided in Section 
3 from West Africa, where land users are being 
included in delimitations of land parcels and/or 
provided with a certificate for land registration 
as individuals or groups but given freedom (at 
least in theory) to decide what level of rights 
they record (individual, family, group of heirs). 
2. Developing a shared vision
A second common component of the territorial/
rangeland approaches summarised above is 
that of establishing a vision that is shared by all 
stakeholders. Without this, it is unlikely that a 
process of collective access will be fully achieved 
and conflicts between land users will be avoided. 
This shared vision should be part and parcel 
of a broader vision of social transformation 
and development. Land use planning and 
issues of tenure and property rights should be 
embedded within and/or linked with wider 
development processes from the start. Where 
there are multiple users of land and resources 
and different interest groups with different rural 
agendas, the process can become complicated, 
though not unfeasible. Care will need to be 
taken in deciding who should be involved in 
these processes, which should be as inclusive as 
possible.
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“Scenario planning” has proved to be a useful 
way of engaging with stakeholders, sharing 
understanding, exploring potential change, 
and defining a common vision to meet 
development needs, as well as achieving 
environmental management and protection 
(Sayer 2009). SOS Sahel International UK and 
IIED have supported governments in Kenya and 
Niger to work with communities to define their 
needs and have suggested alternative scenarios 
in relation to social development, including 
mobility and education. The results have formed 
the basis of land use and development and 
education policies and strategies in the regions. 
The experiences showed that the process was 
particularly useful for planning in a context of 
“uncertainty” and so highly suitable for rangeland 
communities. Guidelines to this effect have 
been produced (SOS Sahel/IIED 2009; Cavanna 
and Abkula 2009).
Visual representations can offer a better route 
to communication and understanding than 
mere description – “a picture paints a thousand 
words”. Community maps can be developed to 
illustrate the desired outcomes or a vision for 
the future (as used in Uganda: Boedhihartono 
and Barrow 2008). 3D geographical visualisation 
tools (Petit et al. 2006) and modelling packages 
such as STELLA, SIMULE, or VENSIM (purchasable 
over the Internet) can also be used. An example 
from Indonesia describes the use of STELLA 
to explore different future scenarios and their 
implications for forest cover and for local 
communities’ incomes from oil palm investment 
and REDD (Indonesia: Sandker et al. 2008). 
The understanding of such media by local 
communities should not be underestimated. 
Such processes can be time-consuming, 
however, and it is necessary to balance the 
constraints of deadlines and time pressures with 
the needs and paces of different stakeholders. 
The agenda should not be an end but a means to 
achieve a collectively defined desired outcome.
3. Negotiating and building 
consensus
For many of the approaches described above, 
the most important stage of any change in land 
tenure and use is the period of negotiation and 
consensus building. Again, these can end up 
Box 3.4: Incorporating local rights in Mozambique
In Mozambique, the 1997 Land Law contains an innovative and now almost universally applied instrument for ensuring 
that local rights are not overlooked in the new DUAT (land use and benefit right in its Portuguese acronym) processes. 
The “community consultation” required by law obliges an investor to determine if the land being requested is “free from 
occupation”. The consultation is attended and directed by local government officers, who must then issue a statement as to 
whether the request can proceed or not. If the land is occupied – and in reality most land is occupied – the consultation must 
then determine the conditions through which local people will cede their rights (if they want to), or share them in some way. 
While local rights do not need to be registered, in situations where demand for land and resources is rising, it is a good idea 
to give them stronger protection through some form of mapping and cadastral process. This helps to show where rights exist 
before the investors arrive. A Technical Annex to the Land Law Regulations was developed by the Interministerial Commission 
on the basis of 21 pilot exercises in community delimitation. This is a form of participatory rural appraisal which produces a 
series of participatory maps and, finally, an officially recognised map that is recorded in the official cadastral database. Once 
land is recorded, the local community is then free to consult with outsiders over access to it and to make agreements with 
them over the resources that they want to use (Tanner et al. 2009).
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being long, protracted processes of discussions 
between different stakeholders, but reaching 
agreement at an early stage will provide a 
stronger foundation for later implementation. It 
is likely that such processes will require external 
facilitation, mediation, and arbitration. 
Negotiations will be required between different 
stakeholders to reach agreement over how 
resources are/will be accessed and managed, 
who has access and when, how, and where, 
etc. Trade-offs are likely to be necessary. Special 
attention will need to be given to ensuring that 
groups who are normally marginalised from 
decision-making processes are provided with 
opportunities to fully take part. This may include 
women, youth, hunter-gatherers, and those 
with lower status in the community. Societies 
more directly dependent on natural resources 
are likely to be happier to spend more time 
negotiating their access and management.
There is a need to think of objectives and trade-
offs in a way that minimises conflict; allows 
negotiation to focus on essentials; and allows 
for innovative approaches and solutions. Some 
important insights are contained in the literature 
on conflict management (Fisher et al. 2000). It is 
suggested that parties in negotiations should 
not argue over positions but rather should focus 
on interests, and the definition of the problem 
behind the interest is said to constitute a 
precondition for an analysis of the stakeholder’s 
margin of flexibility (FAO 2002). 
Though “consensus” should be aimed for, it 
should be understood in its broader term 
and does not have to result in a sense of total 
satisfaction achieved by everyone involved. 
Reaching consensus is likely to be more difficult 
in larger multi-use landscapes with a greater 
number of different stakeholder groups, many 
of whom are mobile or secondary/tertiary users 
and not easily identifiable. Though it is unlikely 
that all stakeholders will ever completely agree 
to the same vision, common ground needs to be 
found – and usually can be. A basic principle is to 
seek scenarios where all can win more and lose 
less. Throughout all these processes, skilled and 
unbiased facilitation will be required.
A useful framework for consensus building is 
the Consensus Framework Methodology based 
upon alternative dispute resolution (Brown 
2000). Other useful tools that have been used 
to facilitate decision-making processes where 
a large number of different stakeholders with 
different knowledge sets and different ways 
of reaching decisions (including non-linear) 
exist include Participatory Landscape/Lifescape 
Appraisal (Mali: Crane undated), Participatory 
Multi-Criteria Analysis (see, for example, Salgado 
et al. 2006 for use in an evaluation of water 
governance alternatives), and Multiple Criteria 
Decision Support (Finland: Kangas et al. 2005; 
Iran: Babie-Kafaky et al. 2009). Many of these 
generate and/or use models or computer 
software packages to sort and evaluate large 
volumes of data generated. 
4. Implementation, including 
adaptive management
A fourth common feature to these approaches 
is the emphasis on developing realistic ways of 
implementation, which may involve capacity 
building, changing roles and responsibilities, 
and the seeking out of new information and 
knowledge to deal with new challenges and 
problems. Monitoring and evaluation are also 
vital to good implementation, which should 
include mechanisms for reflection and learning 
and the feeding of results back into action. 
Having clarity on the overall goal of an 
intervention is essential, but it is a mistake to 
lock in too early to a specific pathway to 
that goal. Rangelands and the aspirations 
of those who have a stake in them are 
constantly evolving and changing. Many 
of the processes, activities, and institutions 
may be new to different stakeholders and 
will require “learning by doing”. There can be 
no fixed target or endpoint and stakeholders 
need to be constantly experimenting, 
listening, learning, and adapting. Muddling 
through provides a better conceptual basis 
for engagement than detailed design (Sayer 
2009). And at the very least, a process of 
adaptive management (see, for example: 
http://www.eeeee.net/watershed.htm) 




“ ”There are different tools that can be used for strengthening tenure. In order to reach the consensus and agreement described above, discussions and questions will need to focus 
on whether formalisation is necessary and, if 
so, in what form. Is titling the only answer, or 
can security be found in other types of tenure? 
Are there provisions in the law that allow for 
collective ownership of common land and 
shared resource utilisation? If so, can this overlap 
with individual private tenure arrangements? Or 
is new legislation required? Which sets of rights 
require formal recognition? And how can this 
be achieved? The question of institutions and 
governance will also need to be considered, and 
is the subject of the following section. 
“Security” and “insecurity” mean different 
things to different land users in a broad range 
of settings, and/or for different resources at 
different times and scales. However, Liz Alden 
Wily (2005a) argues:
Whether we like it or not, this means 
registration. We cannot escape the reality 
that each and every common property estate 
must be defined, its customary owners known 
and institutional representation established in 
order for the owners to hold onto that property 
and reap future benefits from it. If this is not 
undertaken we are merely sustaining the past 
and present in which some millions of hectares 
of invaluable property on this continent are 
annually lost to the majority rural poor.
So how then do we move forward? Above, 
the importance of scale has been highlighted, 
and that of developing a system or approach 
that gives recognition to territory, landscape, 
domain, or rangeland and its importance for 
many users and in particular pastoralists. Within 
(or beneath) this larger area or layer, different 
tenure options or tools for gaining tenure 
security can be developed and protected 
through various statutory and/or customary 
arrangements for different sets of rights. 
Some of these may already be protected by 
statutory law, including individual landholdings 
Tools: Strengthening tenure systems4
Box 4.1: Security and insecurity
Informality is not equal to insecurity, and conflicts over land are frequently related to failures in arbitration systems more than 
to informality (Lavigne-Delville 2010). It has been shown that in many cases customary rights can provide greater perceived 
security than formal or statutory rights. Security is not dependent upon land titling (Platteau 1996) and there are a large 
number of factors that also influence the level of rights that a land user or “owner” may hold, including wealth, education, 
marital status, sense of “belonging”, relations with previous owners or with other landowners, and degree of investment in the 
land (Flintan 2011a).
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and, in the case of Tanzania, common village 
lands. Others may require recognition and/or 
formalisation/registration either through already 
existing legislation or through the design of new 
measures. Of prime importance are those “hot 
spot” areas that are vital for rangeland users and 
also a priority for investors.
“New” tools for 
strengthening tenure
As suggested above, different sets of rights 
will exist within or beneath the landscape or 
rangeland layer. Ways to protect and/or formalise 
these different sets of rights include: 
1. Delimitation of community land;
2. Rangeland management agreements across 
villages or other units;
3. Group leases;
4. Protection of “tenure niches”;
5. Other tools.
1. Delimitation of community 
land
Delimitation of community land is a process that 
shows the extent of and proves the existence 
of community-held land. FAO has developed a 
process called “participatory land delimitation” 
(FAO 2002; Hatcher 2009) and in Mozambique the 
process has been incorporated into legislation. 
This delimitation provides an extra layer of 
protection to the already formally recognised 
and community-held land or DUAT. Formally 
placing a line around the local community and 
transferring it to an official map also proves 
the many hundreds or even thousands of local 
rights that exist within its borders (see Box 4.2).
The process could go one step further and 
obtain a title document; however, this is a costly 
process and involves demarcation (detailed 
surveying and placing of cement markers round 
the registered limits of the DUAT). It is also 
possible to provide titles for individual plots 
of land within a DUAT (with the agreement 
of the community etc., as in Angola). For the 
majority of communities in Mozambique, 
the Delimitation Certificate provides enough 
security of tenure, for the time being at least, and 
under Mozambican law should provide enough 
Box 4.2: Delimitation of community lands in Mozambique
Delimitation of community-held lands is being carried out in Mozambique as part of the process of providing communities/
individuals with land rights through a DUAT (land use and benefit right). This is a relatively quick and cost-effective technique: 
the state only has to survey and register the overarching unit. The process has been incorporated into the Mozambican Land 
Law. A “Certificate of Delimitation” is produced that details the limits of a given community DUAT; these are described in the 
accompanying maps and forms. The certificate confirms a given community as the land and resource management entity 
responsible for the resources within its borders, including conflict resolution. All land belongs to the state and cannot be 
bought or sold. 
Delimitation is legally mandatory under the Land Law Regulations and it must be carried out using participatory techniques 
involving the whole community and its neighbours, otherwise the process is flawed and legally invalid. The Annex to the 
Delimitation Certificate provides forms that are signed by community representatives and other key actors, to show that each 
step has been correctly undertaken. These steps are described in Tanner et al. (2009).
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formalised proof of rights to occupy. The costs 
of registering a DUAT covering roughly 10,000 
households and delimitation amount to USD 
10,000 including NGO salaries – without these, 
the cost could be brought down to USD 5,000–
6,000. It is estimated that the costs of delimiting 
one plot of 2–10 hectares would be USD 400 
(Tanner et al. 2009).
Some restrictions or clauses may be included in 
the registration. These might: 
•	 Prohibit a customary group from selling its 
land except to another customary group or 
the state;
•	 Allow a customary group to enter into long-
term leases with outsiders or individual 
members of the customary group;
•	 Prevent customary groups from sub-dividing 
their land into individual parcels that can be 
sold, except in a few circumstances.
However, it is rare to find examples of customary 
land sales being allowed, although there are 
some examples in the Asia-Pacific region. Even 
in these countries there are restrictions on the 
type and eligibility of purchasers of customary 
land. Customary groups have shown very little 
interest in permanently cutting ties to their land 
by selling it, so there seems little reason to allow 
it, particularly if provisions exist for long-term 
leases, which if properly supported by the state 
provide sufficient tenure security for people to 
borrow money, invest, and develop customary 
land (AusAid 2008).
2. Rangeland management 
agreements across villages or 
other units
The fragmentation of rangelands is reaching 
a critical point, with access to resources being 
blocked and resources being divided up and 
privatised. The negative impacts of this are slowly 
being recognised and efforts are being made to 
a) re-join fragmented areas; and b) prevent any 
more fragmentation happening.
In Kenya, for example, many group and 
individual ranches (described in Section 1) 
are reconsolidating, with owners taking down 
fences and working together to jointly manage 
livestock and wildlife (Mwangi and Ostrom 2009). 
Organisations such as the Northern Rangelands 
Trust, African Wildlife Foundation, and Laikipia 
Wildlife Forum are supporting ranch owners 
in this process and acting as coordinators and 
facilitators of the agreements. However, it seems 
likely that these organisations have a greater 
concern for wildlife and creating larger areas for 
animals to roam rather than for encouraging a 
return to more mobile livestock herding.8
The experience of Tanzania and its village land 
use planning that provides rights to villages to 
use their land as common property has been 
described earlier in this paper. This system has 
been criticised for delimiting land into set zones, 
with boundaries that may restrict mobility 
for pastoralists and other rangeland users, 
so removing the flexibility required for many 
rangeland livelihood systems. However, what 
has received less recognition, and as such has 
rarely been implemented to date, is the fact that 
legislation in Tanzania also provides for inter-
village agreements that can result in mechanisms 
to allow for the sharing of resources and 
movement across village boundaries. As such, 
if several villages in one territory or rangeland 
8  Indeed, “whistle-blowing” suggests that the NRT has 
been pushing the establishment of conservancies with-
out due attention to local communities, particularly 
pastoralists, and their needs and priorities. As a result, 
pastoralists have lost further access to grazing land and 
other resources. In some areas the further establishment 
of conservancies has been halted (MID-P 2010).
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can plan and work together, it is possible that 
traditional land use systems that cross village 
boundaries, and might mean movement from 
one part of a territory or rangeland to another, 
can be accommodated. 
Lessons from West Africa and the agreements 
that have been developed under conventions 
locales have stressed the importance of 
formalising and providing legal backing to these 
agreements (see Section 2). The legislation in 
Tanzania provides a framework for this to occur. 
3. Group leases
In some parts of the world, including in Central 
Asia and in Europe, leases for land and resources 
are provided to pastoralist groups. These can be 
combined with private individual ownership 
of key point resources (or “tenure niches” – see 
below). In places as diverse as the western 
United States, parts of the Andes, Switzerland, 
and Wales, access to corporately managed 
summer mountain pastures is reserved for 
those who own adjacent private agricultural 
land at lower altitudes. It is suggested that such 
combinations of corporate/group and private 
land appropriation have applications in many 
other places.
UNDP’s Global Drylands Imperative (2003) 
suggests that group leases can provide 
greater protection, flexibility, and autonomy 
for customary tenure systems. Leases can be 
provided to well-defined, usually kin-based 
(though they could be area-based) associations 
of herders, who negotiate among themselves 
stocking rates, rules, responsibilities, and 
management objectives. The state retains 
overall ownership of the resource, while granting 
long (50-year) renewable leases to pastoralist 
groups under well-defined conditions as to 
the quality of use and providing an accepted 
legal framework to settle disputes that cannot 
be resolved by the herders themselves. The 
group or association would obtain exclusive use 
rights over the pasture within its domain and 
would organise, monitor, and enforce pasture 
use among its members. Leases with a set of 
ecological benchmarks and periodic reviews 
eliminate the problem of group ranches, which 
drift towards sub-division and privatisation (as 
described earlier).
In Namibia, group leases have been provided 
through the conservancy programme, allowing 
residents of communal lands to form a local 
organisation, defined by a governing constitution, 
membership, and land area, and to apply to the 
government for user rights over the wildlife it 
contains. Since the late 1990s, the number of 
conservancies has increased rapidly to around 50. 
They now cover more than 14% of the country, 
are home to more than 200,000 people, and earn 
between USD 2.5 million and USD 3.1 million per 
annum. Key wildlife resources have recovered and 
illegal use of wildlife has fallen (Roe et al. 2009; 
Holden et al. 2008). Many of these conservancies 
cover areas inhabited by pastoralists and have 
large stocks of wildlife, which provide revenues 
from tourism and sports hunting. How easy it is to 
replicate the conservancy approach is debatable, 
however, as Namibia offers a particular set of 
enabling policy and legislative factors (including 
lack of corruption and willingness to allow 
communities rights to wildlife) that do not exist in 
the majority of other African countries. However, 
even here security of rights is not entirely assured 
(see Box 4.3).
Leasing to other stakeholders
When customary groups have clear tenure over 
their lands, then there should also be provisions 
for them to formally lease them to particular 
members or outsiders to use and so derive an 
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income from them. This is common practice in 
many customary lands in the Asia-Pacific region, 
where it is now common for land required by 
government to be leased rather than through 
voluntary purchase or compulsory acquisition. 
Leases can include terms and conditions to 
allow customary landowners to retain certain 
controls over the land for the term of the lease 
(AusAid 2008). 
However, it is unlikely to be good practice to leave 
dealings in customary land in the hands of an 
unregulated market. Customary landowners are 
often not equipped to engage in such dealings 
in the same way as outside investors, especially 
foreign investors. They can lack knowledge and 
information as a result of limited educational 
opportunities, inexperience in doing business in 
the formal economy, and poor access to business 
support services. Bad deals can cause conflict 
within the group as well as lead to land conflicts 
that have the potential to undermine the attraction 
of a country as a place to invest. It may be in the 
interests of all stakeholders therefore to ensure that 
members of customary groups do not enter into 
land deals that could cause tension or conflict.
The principle of “free, prior, and informed 
consent” has been developed as a benchmark 
in international and domestic law to protect 
customary groups in dealings with outsiders, 
including governments. In international law the 
principle is used in relation to the relocation 
of customary groups, the use of cultural and 
traditional knowledge, projects on customary 
land, or the introduction of new legislation 
concerning a customary group (ILO 2005). 
Box 4.3: Rights under Communal Area Conservancies, Namibia
Clear legal rights to use and manage resources are given to community institutions in Namibia, avoiding regional government 
structures and the need for such structures to further devolve authority. Rather than being defined by artificial administrative 
units, which potentially force together people who would not normally cooperate, communities define themselves, enabling 
the development of cohesive social management units with incentives for individuals to cooperate. 
The rights given to communities over wildlife are relatively strong. In the case of tourism, concessionary rights automatically 
go to a conservancy on registration by the Ministry of Tourism. Communities carry on their normal economic activities within 
a conservancy, and essentially wildlife and tourism become additional forms of land use. Many conservancies zone areas of 
land specifically for wildlife and tourism and, by the consent of members, settlement is either forbidden or discouraged in 
these areas. 
The conservancy policy and legislation are flexible, with communities able to shape their conservancy according to local social 
and ecological conditions, and to choose their committees in a manner consistent with their own cultural norms. Communities 
have a stronger socio-political voice, through their recognition as democratically elected and locally accountable institutions. 
However, communities face challenges with respect to security of tenure and control of access to resources. The current system 
of “open access” to communal land in Namibia, without giving secure and exclusive land tenure to a particular community, is 
a threat to the conservancy approach. Some protection for conservancies is provided in the Communal Land Reform Act of 
2002. Land Boards, which were created under the Act, may not allocate communal land for leasehold in a conservancy if this 
is contrary to the management plan of the conservancy, and conservancies are represented on Land Boards. However, the 
Act does not provide sufficient group tenure for conservancies to exclude people from land set aside for wildlife and tourism 
(Holden et al. 2008).
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4. Protection of tenure “niches”
As described in Section 2, customary institutions 
protect tenure “niches”, which could be specific 
individual camping sites, winter barns and animal 
shelters as found in central Asia, or water points, 
hayfields/enclosures, or trees found elsewhere. 
Traditionally these resources would have been 
controlled and secured through customary 
common property regimes. However, today this is 
becoming increasingly difficult to achieve due to 
an increase in individualisation and privatisation, 
greater competition over resources between 
people and livestock with growing populations 
and reduced access, and the introduction of new 
regimes such as government- or NGO-supported 
water points that demand water user groups and 
new rules and regulations. 
However, the value of customary regimes is 
being recognised, and not least in proving 
more capable of supporting the different 
needs of resource users and in preventing 
conflicts. In southeastern Ethiopia, complex 
forest institutions exist for different tenure 
niches within the moist forest areas found 
there, including the determining of user blocks 
of forest (called ‘kobo’) and overlapping rights 
to use specific trees for beehives. NGOs are 
working with local governments in the area to 
formalise these arrangements as part of PFM 
agreements. In Australia, mechanisms exist 
whereby beekeepers can apply for a licence to 
place beehives on pastoral lands held by a group 
or individual as a leasehold, which, subject to 
a successful outcome, will be registered with 
the Department of Conservation and Land 
Management (http://www.naturebase.net). 
5. Other tools
In addition, there are a number of other sources 
of property and/or access rights that might exist, 
including international treaties and laws, religious 
laws and practices, project (or donor) rules e.g. 
within projects, and organisational laws such as 
those made by user groups (Meinzen-Dick et al. 
2005). In the past, these rules and regulations 
have been very much imposed, but it is slowly 
being recognised that usually “communities 
know best” and therefore these would be more 
effective if based on, if not actually designed by, 
rangeland users i.e. communities. 
In some rangelands, forests and woodlands 
are already afforded protection as community 
forest reserves, under PFM (participatory forest 
management), for example. This can provide 
useful security whilst protection of the whole 
rangeland is being negotiated. Where forests 
and woodlands are not under such protection, 
it is an important option for communities 
to consider. It is likely also to double the 
potential compensation value of the area – as 
a community rangeland and as a protected 
forest area – should government or other parties 
persist in co-opting it (Alden Wily 2005a).
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In Section 4, alternatives and options for 
rangeland land use planning, management, and 
tenure at different scales and for different layers 
were suggested. But there is also a clear need 
for a functioning institutional entity or set of 
entities through which common (and individual) 
property owners may protect, control, regulate, 
receive, deliver, and use resources and distribute 
benefits (Alden Wily 2005a). 
In multi-use landscapes such as rangelands, 
it is suggested that this can be achieved by 
working through a “nested” governance 
system accounting for different spatial scales, 
authorities, and functions and incorporating 
the overlapping and overlaying rights described 
above (Marshall 2008; Cash et al. 2006; Gibson 
et al. 2000 in Mwangi and Ostrom 2009; Niamir-
Fuller 2005; Cousins 2007).9 
To date, identifying and maintaining such 
a governance system across the different 
layers and scales of customary and statutory 
tenure regimes in rangelands has proved very 
challenging. Though many resources tenure 
regimes (customary or other) exist, they have 
often been unable to enforce regulations or 
protect the resources from encroachment. 
The first step in any discussions or decisions 
about governance systems will be to fully 
understand those that already exist as part 
of the understanding/learning phase of the 
9  For a discussion on the notion of “nesting”, see Marshall 
(2008), who explores what can be learned from nested 
community-based governance systems for Australian 
ecologies that are very large but composed of mean-
ingful units at multiple spatial scales. 
processes described in Section 3. Tools such as 
“appreciative inquiry” have been found useful in 
this regard, particularly at a multi-user landscape 
scale.10
Institutions for the 
different layers of 
tenure regimes
This section explores alternatives and options 
for the types of institution (sets of regulations/
rules, organisations, groups, etc.) that might be 
appropriate for the different layers of a “nested”, 
“hierarchal” governance system. In addition, it 
highlights key factors that appear important for 
the success of institutional development and 
good governance. 
1. The rangeland, territory, 
domain, or landscape layer
It has been suggested previously that the 
largest and most encompassing layer of a 
“nested hierarchy of tenure regime” is the whole 
rangeland, territory, domain, or landscape/
watershed. The appropriate institution for 
10  “Appreciative inquiry” is about the co-evolutionary 
search for the best in people, their organisations, 
and the relevant world around them. In its broad-
est sense, it involves systematic discovery of what 
gives “life” to a living system when it is most alive, 
most effective, and most constructively capable 
in economic, ecological, and human terms. See: 
http://appreciativeinquiry.case.edu/intro/whatisai.cfm
Structures: Multi-level 
institutions for the rangelands5
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governing this area could take a number of 
forms; some key characteristics are provided in 
Box 5.1.
There are risks in using the rangeland or landscape 
concept as a justification for centralised 
planning and in attempting to control the ways 
in which objectives are balanced. But as Fisher 
et al. (2005: 92) declare: “We are arguing for 
negotiated landscapes, not planned landscapes” 
– where the lower institutional layers of nested 
governance systems are provided with relative 
space, autonomy, and power to control and 
develop their resources as they see fit. 
Government institutions
Some argue that government institutions are the 
most appropriate bodies for governing common 
pool/property resources (for example, in Ngaido 
and McCarthy 2005). Indeed, government 
assistance can be useful where cooperation 
between stakeholders is weak; the group of 
stakeholders is large with diverse interests; local 
institutions lack capacity; and where there are 
groups that are clearly discriminated against. 
In addition, any organisation (in particular one 
responsible for valuable resources) will need to 
be protected from co-option and manipulation 
by elites (Fernandez-Gimenez 2002).
Governments can improve the economic 
incentives for collective action and the 
participation of community members in 
the management of the commons. A state 
can give technical assistance to local groups 
attempting to improve and intensify resource 
management, encourage knowledge transfer 
and the dissemination of information, and play 
an active role in the transfer of basic skills. A state 
can also encourage income diversification and 
seek the involvement of the private sector, as 
well as provide security and the guarantee of 
minimum livelihood protection for multi-use 
landscape users. This may include the design 
of contingency plans and the creation of safety 
nets in the case of droughts. If the government 
does not have the resources to carry out all 
these tasks, they can be contracted out to NGOs 
or private sector actors (Nicholson 2009).
Higher levels of government can facilitate the 
assembly of rangeland users in organisational 
meetings, provide information that helps 
identify the problem and possible solutions, and 
legitimise and help enforce agreements reached 
by local users. National governments can at 
times, however, hinder local self-organisation 
by defending rights that lead to over-use or 
maintaining that the state has ultimate control 
over resources without actually monitoring and 
enforcing existing regulations (Ostrom et al. 
1999). 
The close regulation of tenure systems by 
government may not be required, and legal 
frameworks can focus on procedural rather 
than substantive law. Procedural law would 
“specify the framework within which interested 
parties could legitimately put forward claims to 
resources, the administrative/legal institutions 
which should process claims, the criteria for 
choosing between opposing claims, and 
enforcement procedures” (Cousins 2002).
Flexibility can be maintained by the legal 
recognition and development of appropriate 
legal language. This entails developing local 
administrative and judicial institutions to 
manage common property that recognise 
temporary rights of usage, establish – through 
local dialogue and participation – the principles 
and guidelines for judging claims, create the 
means and procedures for enforcing rules, 
and develop appropriate conflict resolution 
mechanisms that fill gaps left by disintegrating 
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Box 5.1: Key characteristics of institutions for governing multi-use rangelands
The key characteristics of institutions to govern multi-use landscapes/territories such as rangelands include being able to:
1. Accommodate different interests and include diverse individuals and groups (Fisher et al. 2005) with strong leadership 
and highly motivated leaders (Namibia: Atkinson et al. 2006; Tanzania: Kipuri and Sorensen 2008);
2. Instill a high level of ownership amongst stakeholders over management, decision-making, and benefit distribution 
(Namibia: Atkinson et al. 2006);
3. Enable meaningful negotiations between individuals and groups of stakeholders with diverse and competing interests and 
different levels of power to reduce/resolve conflicts (Fisher et al. 2005; Mwangi and Dohrn 2006), and avoid discrimination;
4. Support agreement and cooperation between land users, and collective actions (including willingness to invest) for 
shared and common goals/visions (see Section 4) (Namibia: Kirk et al. 2010; India: SA PPLPP 2009);
5. Make and enforce rules (discussed in more detail below) (Ostrom et al. 1999; Fratkin and Mearns 2003), including taking 
action if a community member transgresses an agreement (Namibia: Atkinson et al. 2006);
6. Manage resources through common property regimes (the key characteristics required for this are described in e.g. 
Ostrom 1994), including the authority to grant use rights (sometimes temporary) to secondary and tertiary users (Niamir-
Fuller 2005), though there may be a need for individual rights to exist e.g. around urban areas;
7. Track and adapt to change (temporary or permanent, sudden- or slow-onset) in socio-political and environmental contexts 
requiring flexibility and diversity in design (Ngaido and McCarthy 2005); 
8. Most importantly, institutions (customary or other) should be provided with legal recognition, status, and protection with 
clearly defined agreements and responsibilities and ability to enforce by-laws etc. (UNDP 2003; Botswana and Namibia: 
Atkinson et al. 2006; Acre, Brazil: Pires 2010; Tanzania: Kipuri and Sorensen 2008). The legitimacy to do so by all land users 
needs to be provided to allow them to function effectively.
customary systems and inappropriate Western 
systems (Niamir-Fuller 2005).
Customary institutions (and land or pasture 
councils)
Others argue that it should be customary 
institutions which manage rangelands. They 
are better able to work out mutually beneficial 
arrangements for land users (particularly where 
traditional and local). They are closer to the 
communities who are directly deriving benefits 
from common resources and thus in a better 
position to influence their behaviour and provide 
a platform for voicing their opinions (West Africa: 
Williams 1998). Internally enforced contracts tend 
to be stronger than those enforced by outsiders 
(Swallow and Bromley 1992). Communities 
have greater trust in institutions that they have 
some control or influence over. They tend to be 
more flexible, cost-effective, inclusive, and able 
to promote a more holistic approach (Marshall 
2008).
Indeed, in many pastoral areas customary 
institutions still provide the most appropriate and 
capable governance structures, and in particular 
in places where the state apparatus does not 
exist or is in retreat. However, this does not 
mean that authority should simply be assigned 
to local users without ascertaining the range of 
uses and diversity of interests, or that customary 
governance institutions should be uncritically 
resurrected. First, it is vital to understand the 
current strengths and weaknesses of customary 
institutions, and how they may have changed; 
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how they can be best strengthened, adapted, or 
indeed replaced in order to deal with modern day 
influences; and how they can fit with other sets of 
institutions or the priorities of other stakeholders.
Legitimacy and accountability are not necessarily 
linked – traditional community decision-making 
institutions are often most legitimate in the eyes of 
local communities, but rarely have formal systems 
to ensure accountability and representation, for 
example with respect to women. Customary 
institutions may be inefficient, difficult to 
apply to modern administrative purposes, and 
extremely hierarchical or undemocratic. They 
may have been captured by elites or outsiders, 
would not perform in the public interest if given 
new powers, and might result in conflicts or 
inefficient utilisation of resources (UNDP 2003; 
Williams 1998). 
Indeed, in Kyrgyzstan, it is suggested that too 
much trust in “traditions” by national and foreign 
policy-makers has meant the giving (back) of 
rangeland decision-making power to “traditional” 
grazing associations, without any discussion as 
to how this should be carried out or how issues 
of mobility will be addressed. This is threatening 
the sustainability of both the institutions and the 
rangeland (Jacquesson 2010).
As a result, it may be better to create new 
institutions to resolve problems of representation 
and democratic principles, rather than ask a 
customary institution to change too much and 
to become weaker in the process.
Liz Alden Wily (2005a, 2005b) argues that ideally 
“customary domains” should be governed by 
elected or at least partially elected community 
Land or Pasture Councils (Alden Wily 2005a, 
2005b, 2008b) charged by the community with 
the oversight and regulation of customary rights 
within the domains. This would also allow root 
title to be vested in these bodies as trustees on 
behalf of the owning community membership. 
In Iran, for example, pastoralists have developed 
a Council for Sustainable Livelihoods, a 
“new” autonomous organisation built upon 
traditional patterns (see Box 5.3). Alternatively, 
in participatory rangeland management (PRM), 
it is suggested that the governing body should 
be the relevant customary institution (assuming 
it still exists and holds appropriate authority/
power) with the members of the group being the 
legitimised “owners” and/or managers of the land. 
Co-management organisations
Experience from landscape approaches based on 
CBNRM and CCAs suggests a co-management 
organisation made up of different stakeholders, 
including local communities, government, 
conservation and development agencies/NGOs, 
Box 5.2: The critical question for governance
The critical question for pastoral governance concerns the relationship between the formal institutions of the state – laws, 
government departments, local administrations – and the informal and partly traditional rules and social structures of 
pastoralists. Pastoral areas are unique in that customary authorities and traditional rules still dominate large areas of decision-
making, having proved resilient and persistent. Formal government authority has struck an uneasy compromise with 
customary authority, and overlaps in its functions. But jurisdictions are ill-defined. Effective pastoral governance needs to be a 
mix, varying with local circumstances, of formal and informal institutions and rules, and this mix should move towards greater 
involvement and responsibility for strengthened informal institutions. The role of formal government should be to provide 
a framework within which customary local institutions and rules regulate everyday economic and political affairs. Often the 
state needs to encourage greater participation and democracy within local decision-making (UNDP 2003).
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commercial actors such as tour operators, etc. 
The different stakeholders can provide different 
input and roles including decision-making, 
advisory, or executive, with responsibility for 
interpreting and implementing decisions 
within a broad framework provided by others. 
Preferably the members of the committee are 
elected, particularly those representing the 
community: it is unlikely to be able to have a 
totally elected membership from all the different 
stakeholder groups, however. 
In Mongolia, Maria Fernandez-Gimenez (2002) 
discusses the opportunities of co-management 
regimes for the rangeland areas found there. 
She notes that the size and scope of territorial 
jurisdiction and the appropriate social scale 
for a rangeland co-management institution 
are crucial decisions, as is the inclusion of the 
multiplicity of distinct and overlapping or nested 
resources. Broader institutions (such as resident 
groups) can provide a valuable coordinating 
function as well as potentially serving as a 
dispute resolution mechanism of first resort for 
the management regimes nested within. They 
can provide a means for herders to help define 
resource use rules, while empowering local 
government to enforce them, and enhancing 
the legitimacy of government actions through 
herder participation in decision-making. 
Co-management institutions also have the 
potential to perform additional functions, such 
as development of transportation or livestock 
marketing cooperatives.
Advisory councils or groups
There may also be a role for an advisory group 
at rangeland or landscape level. This could be 
linked to regional or local government (see Box 
5.4) or be made up of a group of more technical 
experts for wildlife or rangeland management. 
Such a council or group can play an important 
role as an independent source of information 
and guidance for stakeholders, and in particular 
for local communities whose understanding of 
certain systems, legislation, or practices is low.
Box 5.3: Building new institutions in Iran
The Kuhi – one of about 20 sub-tribes of the Shish Bayli tribe of the Qashqai nomadic pastoralists of Iran – are currently 
engaged in participatory action research about their own sustainable livelihoods and the conservation of biodiversity in 
their landscape. This action research refers to a resource management unit comprising their summering and wintering 
grounds and their associated migration routes in between. As part of this, the Kuhi have held several workshops, and their 
first concern was to involve the whole community. One of the major problems identified was the breakdown of the traditional 
organisational strength of the tribes. They analysed their governance situation in some depth and decided to recreate their 
autonomous organisation, building upon traditional patterns but ensuring that these would be able to respond to modern 
challenges, including notions of participatory democracy. Extended negotiations led to the establishment of the Council 
for Sustainable Livelihoods of the Kuhi Migratory Pastoralists and its associated Community Investment Fund, which is now 
pursuing initiatives in each of the five categories of problems/needs identified by the sub-tribe. Such initiatives include 
support to animal raising, marketing and quality control for highly priced gabbeh rugs produced by women, health-care 
access, capturing of solar energy for various uses, access to legal support, and access to educational books and videos. The 
initiative that excited them the most, however, was the restoring of natural resources to their common property care and 
control (Feyerabend et al. 2004).
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2. The village or district 
layer (based on government 
administrative boundaries)
The minimalist approach
A minimalist approach (Fitzpatrick 2005; Tanner 
et al. 2009) would simply state that “customary 
rights to land are recognised”. Certain areas 
would then be described in land registry maps 
as “customary land”. There would be no attempt 
to define which groups held what customary 
land, and no legal intrusion into areas governed 
by customary law. Customary authorities would 
determine all issues (internal and external) in a 
“tenurial shell” utilising customary processes. 
The only involvement of the state would be 
in establishing and enforcing the external 
boundaries of customary land. This approach 
provides flexibility inside the boundaries and 
opportunities for customary rights to evolve 
over time. It avoids difficult questions about 
state intervention, but provides communities 
with opportunities to control encroachment.
Examples can be found within forest 
management groups, where the boundaries 
have been demarcated and internal issues 
are regulated by the extent of conservation 
plans. Another minimalist example is found 
in Mozambique, with the demarcation of 
customary areas into DUATs (see Box 4.2).
However, under such an approach communities 
must bear all the costs of making, monitoring, 
and enforcing rules regarding rangeland 
management and they may not have the 
technical expertise. One solution is to enter 
into contractual arrangements for improving 
their resources. Under such contracts, as in 
central Tunisia and Morocco, state institutions, 
generally forest services, are entrusted with the 
responsibility for improving and managing the 
resource. After the improvement of the resource, 
rights-holders purchase grazing or cutting 
licences, and the revenues generated are used 
to pay off improvement costs. Theoretically, 
these ranges will revert to communities once 
improvement costs are recovered; in practice, 
however, such transfers have often not taken 
place (Ngaido and McCarthy 2005).
Working through government structures: 
Village Councils and Assemblies
In Tanzania, the two main organs of village 
government are the Village Assembly and the 
Village Council. Both of these play a central role in 
the village land use planning process. The Village 
Assembly comprises all the adults resident in a 
village; the Village Council is the main executive 
body of the community and is elected by the 
Village Assembly every five years. The Village 
Council must receive approval from the Village 
Box 5.4: The Central Land Council in Australia
The Central Land Council (CLC) is one of four Aboriginal land councils in the Northern Territory established under the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (NT) Act 1976. Its mandate is to provide advisory and support services; it does not have the authority 
to do business on behalf of landowners. Instead, decision-making authority lies with land trusts, which act independently of 
the CLC. These trusts are managed by the landowners, and decisions on land dealings are made on the principle of informed 
consent among the owners. It is the role of the CLC to ensure that landowners are fully aware of the consequences of any 
land use agreement and of the options available to them. Experts can be called upon to assist with expressing the needs and 
wishes of Aboriginal people; assisting them to make traditional land claims; consulting with them about any proposed use of 
land; and assisting them to carry out commercial activities (AusAid 2008).
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Assembly for many key decisions involving the 
use of resources. The further approval of the 
elected District Council must also be received 
for village by-laws. As much as possible, the 
whole village is involved in the development of 
village land use plans, which are approved and 
ratified by the Village Assembly and Council and 
the District Council. Once approval has been 
obtained, the villagers begin implementing the 
plans, demarcating the different land use zones 
with paint to mark certain landmarks (UCRT 2010). 
Though legislation encourages Village Councils 
to work together on village land use planning, 
to date there have been few examples of this, 
particularly in the interests of developing cross-
boundary inter-village agreements for use of 
resources. 
Landowning groups or land trusts
If customary groups are to reach a point of 
negotiating access and sale of lands and to 
enter into legally secure transactions with 
outsiders, e.g. investors, then they may need 
to create a legal identity for themselves as a 
landowning group or as individual members of a 
landowning group (called “group incorporation” 
by Fitzpatrick 2005). How the group does this 
could be left to local structures, and some argue 
that incorporation should make as little change 
as possible to internal customary processes. A 
corporate structure could also allow for certain 
constitutional provisions, particularly relating 
to fairness of decision-making and distribution 
of benefits, to be made mandatory; and in this 
sense it goes at least some way to helping 
prevent internal abuses of power (Fitzpatrick, 
2005: 460; Tanner et al. 2009). 
Alternatively, the community could elect 
community members to a trust, which would be 
the body that would represent it in land-related 
issues. Every trust is unique and will reflect the 
terms of agreement between the trustee(s) 
and the beneficiaries (the landowners), as well 
as the common law or relevant legislation (if 
any exists). Outsider investors can transact with 
the trustee(s) with full confidence that they are 
dealing with the legal owner(s) of the land. An 
example of land trusts in Africa can be found in 
Botswana, developed through a project working 
with the Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and 
Tourism (Taylor 2007). An alternative is where 
the state identifies key figures to represent the 
customary groups and who “hold legal title on 
behalf of their customary group” (the “agency” 
method, according to Fitzpatrick 2005). 
Trusts tend to be flexible because they are 
created by agreement between beneficiaries 
– the customary landowners. However, they 
can also be open to abuse of power by the 
trustees and/or other interested stakeholders. 
An alternative is the “registration of individual 
customary landowners”, which sounds good in 
theory but can result in inaccurate details on 
landowners and their customary systems, and 
fragmented landownership (AusAid 2008).
Land boards or commissions
The final option is to create land boards or 
commissions, state bodies that administer and 
manage community lands, with some local 
representation of customary authority included 
in the board. This model is found in Botswana, 
where the Land Boards allocate and manage 
rights, including to outsiders, “on trust for the 
benefit and advantage of the tribesmen of 
that area and for the purpose of promoting 
economic and social development of all the 
peoples of Botswana”. Their primary duties 
are to allocate land within their jurisdiction, 
adjudicate disputes, implement policies for land 
use and planning, and collect leasehold rents. 
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The Botswana boards have evolved over time 
and each now consists of five elected members 
(Fitzpatrick 2005; Tanner et al. 2009). 
However, problems remain, including potential 
exploitation and inappropriate state intervention. 
In Botswana this system has been used to deny 
rights to indigenous groups such as the Basarwa 
(San or Bushmen), ironically on the basis of the 
assertion that other “customary” rights apply in 
the area. Another criticism has been that Land 
Board decisions have tended to favour elite 
groups, particularly large cattle owners (Quan 
2000 in Fitzpatrick 2005). In West Africa, pastoral 
representation in such commissions is low (see 
Box 5.5). Further problems include the promotion 
of individual rights over leaseholds, the destruction 
of collective norms and values, the ever-present 
problems of institutional capacity, and information 
gaps on land holdings, transactions etc. that risk 
infringements of customary rights. 
Governance in 
practice: some key 
principles
Decentralisation and subsidiarity
Within any governance system, it is vital that 
power and authority to make decisions about, 
manage, and protect land and resources are 
delegated (through supporting policy and 
legislation) to the most appropriate and effective 
(efficient and accountable) institution or set of 
institutions (Sayer 2009; UNDP 2003; Namibia 
and Botswana: Atkinson et al. 2006). 
Genuinely devolved and negotiated decision-
making is essential for empowering people 
to manage resources (Fisher et al. 2005) and 
to take into account the multiple functions 
and heterogeneity of users of rangeland 
resources. The involvement of local levels is 
particularly important in order to capture the 
range of rights and issues (Mwangi and Dohrn 
2006). If agreement can be reached between 
Box 5.5: Land Commissions in West Africa
In Cameroon, a Consultative Commission is responsible at the level of district or arondissement for delimiting agricultural 
and pastoral zones, for defining the use of mixed zones, and for the control and litigation of agro-pastoral conflicts. The 
composition of the commission is prescribed by decree, and one member must be a pastoralist or a leader of pastoralists 
(IUCN 2011).
In Niger, the Land Code prescribes the creation of commissions foncières (land-use commissions) at all levels (regions, 
communes, villages) and a by-law defines their composition. However, these tend to be unelected bodies composed largely 
of civil servants (who are rarely aware of the complexity of pastoral systems) and, though they tend to include all professional 
associations, they are likely to have only one pastoral representative, usually chosen by the village authorities. These boards 
have the power to withdraw access to pastoral land if they consider it is not being put to good use. In one example, 
community representatives were chosen by village authorities rather than by communities. In reaction to this, some villages 
complained to the Secretary Permanent of the Rural Land Code and successfully defended the right to be represented by 
representatives chosen by themselves. Today the criterion for the selection of pastoralist commission members is that the 
delegating organisation really represents pastoralist interests (IUCN 2011; Hesse and Thébaud 2006).
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stakeholders at this stage, then all are more likely 
to comply (Dietz et al. 2003).
Where local initiatives already exist, they need 
to be linked or embedded in larger institutional 
processes of decentralisation. For example, the 
“local conventions” in West Africa should be 
part and parcel of bigger land use planning 
processes. The decentralisation of land use 
plans (schémas d’aménagement de territoire) to 
local governments, for example, can enable this 
(Hilhorst 2008). 
The devolution of power also needs to be 
accompanied by appropriate and adequate 
resources to function. This has not happened 
in Niger, where the functioning of commission 
members is hampered by lack of economic 
resources and competencies. Without adequate 
control, this leaves the system open to abuse 
and corruption (IUCN, 2011). Indeed, as long as 
formal survey and mapping, official supervision 
of adjudication, computerisation of records, and 
state-like bureaucratic procedures are required, 
costs and user fees are too high to encourage 
genuine devolution of land administration to the 
grassroots. Once simple models of community-
based land administration are developed, 
tested, and adapted, they can be relatively easy 
to replicate at scale. Madagascar, Ethiopia, Benin, 
and Tanzania offer useful lessons (Alden Wily 
2011).
Systems for rural land administration are slowly 
but surely being decentralised to more local 
levels and in some cases with fully devolved 
powers. Thus far, most of this reaches down only 
to county, district, cercle, or similar levels, which 
are remote from the numerous communities 
where land relations are in practice framed, 
organised, and sustained. A review of CBNRM 
processes in Africa concluded that, despite the 
rhetoric, few communities have been provided 
with formal authority over lands and resources; 
conflicts and imbalances continue between 
local groups and more powerful actors; local 
governance institutions are not downwardly 
accountable to the community and benefits are 
disproportionately captured by local elites, with 
some conflicts between the development of 
locally accountable governance and traditional 
authorities (Roe et al. 2009). 
The experience so far in rangeland management 
indicates a similar pattern where authority for 
decisions and tenure over land and resources 
have failed to be secured at the local level and for 
the primary land users and traditional managers 
– pastoralists and hunter-gatherers. 
In Tanzania, for example, Village Councils 
vary in their ability to enforce laws and to 
oversee them. Collective provisions rely on the 
accountability of local institutions to pursue 
the community’s shared interests (see Box 5.6). 
And “for pastoralists and hunter-gatherers, the 
accountability of village governance institutions 
is often the key difference between whether or 
not local resources are secured and protected, or 
sold off and lost forever” (UCRT 2010).
As such, decentralisation in itself is insufficient, 
as it does not resolve the problems of authority, 
representation, conflicts of interest, etc. at the 
local level. For these reasons, decentralisation 
requires central government to take 
responsibility for providing the broad framework 
and principles underlying tenure, and for 
ensuring the transparency and accountability of 
local structures (Cousins 2002).
Power-sharing
Understanding and working with power relations 
is vital, no matter what type of institution exists or 
is established. Even in relatively benign political 
circumstances, such as in Uganda or Tanzania, 
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governments can be slow to relinquish power 
and, for example, retain control over dealings 
with investors. As described previously, many 
land users do in fact already have written rights 
to their land and resources within constitutions 
and legislation. However, they may lack the 
power of knowledge about such rights and/or 
the means to hold governments accountable 
for them. Despite this, there are increasingly 
examples of judicial action being taken – for 
example, the Karadje land-grabbing case in 
Niger (IUCN, 2011).
Legitimacy and accountability are not necessarily 
linked – traditional institutions are often most 
legitimate in the eyes of local communities, 
but rarely have formal systems been developed 
to ensure accountability and representation, 
for example with respect to women. New 
institutions may prove to be more democratic, 
but may not hold the power of group cohesion.
Communities are not bounded, homogeneous 
entities, but socially differentiated and diverse. 
Gender, caste, wealth, age, origins, and other 
aspects of social identity divide and cut across 
so-called community boundaries. Power is 
a feature of social relations, and demands 
negotiations. Institutions have multiple roles: 
for example, marriage and kinship exchange 
networks facilitate many other things besides 
mediating access to land. They are also dynamic, 
changing over time as social actors alter 
their behaviour to suit new social, political, or 
ecological circumstances (Mearns et al. 1997; 
Amazon floodplains: de Castro undated). The 
social heterogeneity of the user group may 
affect collective action if there are distinct 
levels of authority, perception, trust, access to 
information, level of control, and reciprocity. 
Ben Cousins (2007) suggests that one way 
of overcoming the “customs versus rights” 
polarity is to vest land rights in individuals 
rather than in groups or institutions, and to 
make socially legitimate existing occupation 
and use, or de facto rights, the primary basis 
for legal recognition. These claims may or may 
not be justified by reference to “custom”. Rights-
holders would be entitled to define collectively 
the precise content of their rights and choose, 
by majority vote, the representatives who will 
administer their land rights (e.g. by keeping 
records, enforcing rules, and mediating disputes). 
Accountability of these representatives 
would be downwards to group members, not 
upwards to the state. Gender equality would 
be a requirement before legal recognition of 
rights could occur. This would not be based on 
individual titling, which has been so problematic 
in Africa, but rather a form of statutory right that 
is legally secure but also qualified by the rights of 
others within a range of nested social units, from 
the family through user groups to villages and 
other larger communities with shared rights to a 
range of common property resources. 
Box 5.6: The difference of “accountability”
In Ololosokwan, a village in Tanzania where land use planning has been carried out, the Village Assembly is very active. In 2003 
it demanded an audit of the Village Council’s use of tourism receipts, and then in 2007 it voted to discharge from office the 
entire Village Council and to re-elect a new one, due to allegations of corruption. Arshu village now posts information outside 
the village government office on how tourism revenues are used as one mechanism designed to encourage transparency. 
In some villages, however, communal revenues are not being used transparently and may be primarily benefiting individual 
village leaders (UCRT 2010).
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Effective management and 
implementation
It is not only about the allocation of rights 
(the substance) but also about the rules and 
mechanisms for regulating access and use 
among multiple interests (Sayer 2009). This can 
rarely be achieved without social agreement on 
rules and regulations and how they are enforced. 
They need to be generated at the local level in 
order to fit with local needs. The development 
of by-laws can provide formal legitimacy to local 
rules and regulations. 
Within management, special attention needs to 
be paid to conflict prevention and resolution, 
including identifying areas of potential conflict 
or hotspots (Uganda: Kisamba-Mugerwa et 
al. 2006; Dietz et al. 2003; Tanner et al. 2009); 
the sharing of costs between users and the 
distribution of revenues and benefits (Ngaido 
2005; Binot et al. 2009); and monitoring and 
evaluation, which should be based upon the 
original visions, scenarios, and aims/objectives 
and should provide opportunities for shared 
learning with (and not around) local populations 
and other stakeholders at different levels of the 
landscape, on an ongoing basis (IUCN 2009; 
Fisher et al. 2005; Chitakira and Torquebiau 2010).
Communities are likely to find it difficult to 
bear all the costs of making, monitoring, and 
enforcing rules and they may not have the 
technical expertise. To avoid the need for fencing, 
for example, collective tenure arrangements will 
rely on livestock producers working together 
to monitor and enforce boundaries to ensure 
exclusion of non-members (when necessary) 
(Nicholson 2009). However, as evidence from 
Afghanistan shows, when greater protection 
of rights is gained and conflicts with other 
users resolved, “local communities show an 
extraordinary level of commitment and action to 
community-based conservation management 
– including many sacrifices such as reducing 
livestock numbers, open grazing areas and the 
amount of forage … collected…” (Alden Wily 
2008b).
If users have some initial trust in others to keep 
promises, low-cost methods of regulating, 
monitoring, and sanctioning can be devised 
(Ostrom et al. 1999: 281). In rangelands where 
users move around to use resources, this can 
be a more difficult task. “Grazing management 
by cattle” should be avoided; rather grazing 
needs to included as part of an integrated 
management of the whole rangeland controlled 
by the appropriate institutions (East Africa: Oba 




Experience has shown that simply recognising 
and formalising land users’ rights is not enough 
to ensure security to those rights. Land users 
require the ability to organise, and have rules and 
sanctions; to negotiate and defend their rights 
as “equals” (men and women); to advocate and 
lobby for change; and to develop and diversify 
their livelihoods through entrepreneurship, 
innovation, investments, and competitively 
entering the market (Tanzania: UCRT 2010; 
Namibia: Atkinson et al. 2006; Morocco and Niger: 
Ngaido 2005). This section will consider three 
important areas that require special attention and 
support: capacity building; advocacy, lobbying, 
and social movements; and gender.
Capacity building
Decentralisation can work for pastoral and agro-
pastoral communities. But if they are to benefit, 
local communities have to appropriate the 
process and build their capacities to influence 
local government decision-making processes, 
particularly over land and other natural 
resources. To do this, they need a thorough 
understanding of the key legal provisions within 
decentralisation, pastoral, and other sectoral 
laws. More importantly, they have to understand 
the issues at stake, develop the capacities to hold 
local government to account over the manner in 
which local affairs are managed, and articulate 
a vision for rangelands in a manner that can 
be understood and accepted by policy-makers 
(Hesse and Thébaud 2006; Nori 2007).
In Cameroon, a local NGO, MBOSCUDA (Mbororo 
Social and Cultural Association of Cameroon) 
has used REFLECT11 approaches to provide 
both men and women with opportunities to 
learn about their rights, laws, legislation, etc. 
(Fon 2010). In Tanzania, civic education on 
land rights, etc. and the building of capacity of 
local communities to defend those rights is an 
important part of support programmes in village 
land use planning facilitation (UCRT 2010).
Capacities also have to be built at other levels 
and among other actors. Critically, policy-
makers and local government officials need 
to better understand the dynamics of pastoral 
environments, the complex but essential role 
that social and political networks play in the 
management of natural resources, and the 
central place of pastoralism as a viable system 
and major contributor to national economies, 
particularly in a context of increasing climatic 
uncertainty.
Weakened institutions need to be strengthened 
or the capacities of new institutions built up, 
allowing them to negotiate access for members 
in times of need and to develop reciprocal 
arrangements and manage resources. They need 
to be able to find common ground for divergent 
interests and perspectives, and to develop 
an agreed vision and goals. In addition, the 
mediation/resolution of conflicts, enforcement of 
regulations and agreements, and appropriation of 
sanctions will be important for continuing security 




and sustainable land/resource management 
(Morocco and Niger: Ngaido 2005; Mali: Crane 
undated; India: Lahiri 2010; Namibia: Atkinson et 
al. 2006). Institutions must have the capacity to 
monitor the effectiveness of their programmes, 
learn from their experiences, manage their 
knowledge, and adapt their programmes on the 
basis of this continued learning (Sayer et al. 2008; 
Ngorongoro, Tanzania: Kipuri and Sorensen 2008).
Land managers may also need to develop 
new skills such as dealing with invasive 
species and restoring degraded rangelands or 
woodlands. Capacity building can be integrated 
with participatory experiments on technical 
innovations, so that farmers and herders in the 
community not only address their natural resource 
management problems more effectively but are 
able to develop the social networks, institutional 
structures, and social problem-solving skills that 
enable them to address the broader sociopolitical 





Lobbying and advocacy have proved to 
be important tools for raising the profile of 
issues related to land tenure security and its 
infringements, gaining support from external 
parties, and raising necessary funds. If the profile 
of issues and organisations is increased, and 
a critical mass supports them, then it makes it 
more difficult for national and local governments 
to ignore them. The identification of allies in high 
places and the building of supporting networks 
can be important in this.
In Cameroon, customary land rights have been 
asserted through an award of the court that 
judged the appropriation of land customarily 
used by pastoralists as illegitimate (IUCN, 2011). 
It has also been demonstrated how community 
action, including that undertaken in alliance 
with supportive organisations, expands access 
even where legal frameworks are not supportive 
of collective rights (Fuys et al. 2008). An example 
Box 6.1: Lobbying and direct action for change in northern Tanzania
In mid-2009, a Tanzania police field unit evicted pastoralists from a hunting block in Loliondo district that was allocated to 
a commercial company, Ortello Business Cooperation. Eight villages were burned down and the inhabitants chased off the 
land: over 200 Maasai bomas (fenced area including huts) were said to have been burned; women were raped; more than 
3,000 people were left homeless, without food and other social basic needs; and more than 50,000 cattle were left without 
grazing and water. CSOs and NGOs are well established and networked in Tanzania and are given a relatively large amount of 
political space to advocate for land rights and lobby for positive change. On hearing of the incident in Loliondo, a number of 
these organisations and networks came together with representatives from the media and carried out a detailed investigation 
of the incident (FEMACT 2009). The incident was reported in the international press and in 2010 400 Maasai women made a 
formal protest by handing in their government party membership cards. 
These are among the many activities in which communities, CSOs, and NGOs have been involved in northern Tanzania 
that have played a role in changing legislation, contesting and winning land rights, and turning challenges and threats to 
livelihoods to their advantage. A detailed description of these activities is provided in Nelson (2009). 
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is the establishment of the Pastoral Code in 
Mauritania, Niger, and Mali (Nori 2007). 
Increasingly, pastoralists and other traditional 
land users are mobilising themselves to take 
action to defend their rights and to advocate 
for positive change (see Box 6.1). This might 
take the form of a core group of educated locals 
advocating or defending rights (often in response 
to encroachments on their land); the creation 
of a decentralised organisation, with regional 
and/or local sub-organisations that mobilise 
concerned livestock keepers and build solidarity 
and capacity in order to gain political influence; 
national networks; or the establishment of (self )-
help organisations, which then formally register 
themselves as NGOs or cooperatives (IUCN, 
2011; West Africa: Hesse and Thébaud 2006). 
Pastoral associations can have a dual role. They 
can link local representative groups, through 
regions, to a national lobbying structure. 
They can also facilitate and educate people 
at grassroots level about the processes of 
democracy, especially the importance of 
voting and transparency about policies and 
investments (UNDP 2003: 22). In the Sahel, 
however, although pastoral civil society groups 
are beginning to occupy a prominent place on 
the development scene and are commanding 
an increasing proportion of development aid, 
they remain relatively weak:
They lack the skills to articulate and defend 
the interests of their members, have difficulty 
in establishing a common front with each 
other or forging strong institutional links 
with other groups, and have limited financial 
resources and management skills. Almost 
exclusively established by an educated elite 
… many organisations do not have a strong 
rural constituency and have weak links with 
customary pastoral authorities. By using many 
of these organisations as conduits for the 
implementation of rural service delivery, well-
meaning northern donors and NGOs have 
to a certain extent diverted the attention of 
pastoral associations away from the need to 
address their internal institutional weaknesses 
(e.g. accountability, representation) and 
strengthen their lobbying and advocacy skills. 
(Hesse and Thebaud 2006)
Sometimes it may prove too politically sensitive 
to lobby and advocate for pastoral rights at 
the local level, i.e. where organisations and 
individuals are well known. As a result, pastoral 
organisations and/or NGOs may have greater 
influence and effect outside the area, and 
often work through an umbrella organisation 
to avoid being singled out (Northern Tanzania: 
Kipuri and Sorensen 2008). Influencing the 
policy environment requires long-term 
commitment and resources, involving different 
stages with different people. Alliances between 
organisations at national and international 
levels can have a far greater impact than can 
individuals. However, where governments are 
not open to pressure from civil society, quiet 
lobbying using personal contacts can be more 
effective, if limited in terms of representation 
and accountability (IIED 2002).
At national level, recent experience with 
pastoral lobby groups composed of elected 
“ ”
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members of parliament from pastoral areas 
(for example, in Ethiopia and Kenya) is very 
promising. Significantly, some of these lobby 
groups encourage MPs from non-pastoral areas 
to join, so the lobby becomes one in favour of 
representation and development of marginal 
areas and not just a special interest group for 
pastoralists. Individuals may also agree to lobby 
for pastoralist causes in parliament (see Box 6.2). 
Gender
Sensitivity to gender issues needs to be 
maintained throughout activities and processes 
related to land and resources. As explained in 
Section 5, communities are not homogeneous 
entities but are divided by social relations, 
including gender. This is reflected in the different 
ways that men and women use resources, their 
access rights, and their perceptions of tenure 
and resource security. Women and men have 
different needs and different types of assets at 
their disposal for meeting (or not meeting) those 
needs. As a result, their priorities for change will 
also be different.
Customary institutions tend to be dominated 
(at least, in public decision-making) by men. 
As a result, women’s views, needs, priorities, 
and knowledge have often been missed, with 
interventions failing to give them adequate 
attention. Under most customary tenure 
systems, women indirectly benefit by rights to 
land and resources being received through their 
husbands and other male relations, as a member 
of the clan or group. When formalisation of 
customary tenure systems has taken place, 
women’s rights are often ignored, resulting 
in only men gaining from the formalisation 
process, and in some cases women losing out (a 
clear example of this are the losses incurred by 
women in the development of group ranches 
in Kenya – see, for example, Meinzen-Dick and 
Mwangi 2007; other examples can be found in 
Leonard and Toulmin 2000; Morocco: Steinmann 
1998; Sudan: Larsen and Hassan 2003).
As a result, in many cases women are in a 
better position being outside such customary 
systems. And today many customary leaders are 
supporting more gender-equitable practices. A 
sticking point for many land reformists is that 
customary systems need to be changed in order 
that women can inherit land. This may be true, 
but then it is usually the case that not even 
men inherit land but rather the “right to access 
and use land”. And where practices of virilocal 
marriage (i.e. the wife moving to the husband’s 
area) are common, such inheritance rules make 
more sense if common property assets are to be 
protected. 
This is not to say that women should not have 
more secure rights to access, use, and “own” 
resources, including land, but rather change 
Box 6.2: Identifying individuals who can lobby/support marginalised groups
An example of this is the elaboration of the Recognition of Forest Rights Act in India: in the passing of the Scheduled Tribes 
and other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006, a member of parliament belonging to a tribal 
community played an important role as the chairman of the Joint Parliamentary Committee. He was eager to address the 
issues of forest grazing by livestock keepers. Although many members of the committee objected, he was able to convince 
others about the role of livestock keepers in society, and ultimately the issue of grazing rights was included in the final bill 
(IUCN 2011).
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needs to be carried out in a pragmatic and 
informed manner, taking into account the full 
reasons for customary practices, and the trade-
offs required if change occurs. Lessons from 
Mozambique confirm this (see Box 6.3).
Pastoral women in particular are said to face 
a “double marginalisation”: as pastoralists 
and as women (Kipuri and Ridgewell 2008). 
Privatisation of rangeland resources has 
encouraged the spread of fencing and has 
increased concentration around population 
centres: as a result, access to areas where women 
can gather wild plants and wood for fuel, food, 
fibre, medicine, and other purposes has become 
increasingly difficult (Namibia: Sullivan and 
Rohde 2002). Spending more time seeking 
fuel or other plant resources, or having to find 
the money to purchase fuel or water, means 
restructuring domestic activities by spending 
more time on producing items that can be sold 
to finance alternative purchases. Having to rely 
on husbands to provide cash for such items also 
reduces women’s control over resource access. 
The sedentarisation of pastoralists has been 
directly linked to poorer nutrition (Sudan: Larsen 
and Hassan 2003). Sedentarisation also changes 
the roles that men and women play in pastoral 
livelihood systems (Flintan 2008). Often this will 
Box 6.3: Protecting women’s land rights in Mozambique
In the case of Mozambique, women enjoy strong protection through the Constitution and the Land Law itself. In fact, the 
drafters of the Mozambican Land Law did listen to the concerns of the women’s lobby, inserting a key phrase in the article that 
says that rights are acquired by customary norms and practices: “so long as these do not contradict constitutional principles”. 
Other provisions can also be included in a legal framework that allows custom to work in favour of women. Thus, when the 
law recognises rights acquired through custom as being equivalent to the state DUAT (see Box 4.2), the rights that women 
acquire through marriage and by being members of customary groups are also DUATs. They are then subject to the full range 
of constitutional and other guarantees, like any other DUAT. 
Other legal principles, such as co-titling, state that all community members – including women – have an equal say in how land 
management decisions are taken. This offers women the possibility to assert some control over rights and resources within the 
community and how they are managed. Like any other community member, a woman can also elect to take her DUAT out of 
community jurisdiction and ask the public land administration to register it in her individual name. The fact is, however, that 
many local leaders do not know about constitutional principles or the international conventions that protect women. And even 
if they did, they are unlikely to apply them in place of local norms. 
Giving individual titles to women also raises questions about how best to use scarce land administration resources at a time 
when community resources as a whole are under threat from external pressures. Failing to protect the broad sweep of local 
rights within the single DUAT of a community, through delimitation, would leave all local land, not just that of local women, at 
serious risk of capture by other interest groups. Moreover, the Local Community model in the Land Law is intended to devolve 
certain aspects of land and natural resources management to local leaders, and this is to be welcomed in the overall context 
of decentralisation and establishing a more democratic system of governance and development planning. Taking away the 
devolved power of local (male) leaders is therefore not a solution. 
Changing the attitudes of community “land administrators” and local conflict resolution specialists – chiefs, community court 
judges, even traditional healers – will protect women far more than individual titling programmes. The participatory approach 
built into the delimitation process offers many opportunities for doing this (Tanner et al. 2009).
result in women having to work harder to 
take care of new non-livestock-based tasks 
(East and West Africa: Joekes and Pointing 
1991). Diminishing access to livestock also 
curtails traditional exchange networks. 
As market pressures grow, this can make 
it increasingly common for livestock and 
livestock products (including milk, an item 
conventionally associated with women) to 
be disposed of by men without consulting 
their wives. What had been women’s 
“primary” rights to livestock products now 
become “secondary” rights, which are 
more vulnerable to further erosion and 
marginalisation (Joekes and Pointing 1991; 
Flintan 2012).
In the formalisation of customary land and 
resource tenure and in the development 
of appropriate institutions for controlling 
access rights, properties, management, etc. 
in multi-use landscapes, it is vital to account 
for, address, and ultimately mainstream 
gender issues throughout. 
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Key points
This paper has sought to draw out some of 
the lessons learnt from good and bad practice 
examples of recognising and formalising 
customary tenure. Though there might not be a 
“best practice model” for this (as Fitzpatrick 2005 
suggests), there are many examples of different 
systems and components that provide a more 
participatory and ultimately empowering 
approach that has had some success in 
securing rights for rangeland users. Lessons 
from these suggest that the following points 
should be considered a priority in any further 
developments of processes and mechanisms 
to increase land and resource security in the 
rangelands:
1. First and foremost, governments must 
start upholding the rights that rangeland 
users already have (i.e. within constitutions 
and legislation), and be prepared to 
support the provision of future rights: 
until this occurs, no matter what type of 
tenure pastoralists and other rangeland 
users are governed by, they will always be 
vulnerable to loss of land and resources. 
Governments can be held accountable for 
such rights through administrative and court 
procedures, and political demonstrations to 
raise awareness of deficiencies. This has been 
a starting point for many of the successful 
land rights movements around the world. 
Some suggest that, despite the risks of such 
movements (including possible loss of life), 
they are necessary for creating a critical mass 
that has more power and can gain greater 
visibility of the issues and, ultimately, positive 
change. The AU/ECA/AfD Framework and 
Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa (2010) 
and the AU Policy Framework for Pastoralism 
in Africa (2010) offer some space for leverage 
and influence “from above”.
2. A “nested hierarchical” and pluralistic 
tenure system offers the greatest scope 
for addressing the needs that rangeland 
users have for accessing large geographical 
areas to access resources that vary in time 
and space (in particular in more dry and 
variable areas). It also provides flexibility for 
incorporating and recording the complexity 
of different overlapping dynamic and 
shifting rights systems that exist in order to 
control access and to use and manage those 
resources. An example of such a system (in a 
Conclusions7
Figure 7.1: Landscape/territory/rangeland/domain: under authority of land board, 
co-management group, community/customary institution, or other
Rangeland or landscape (domain, 
territory or other) where access to 
land and resources are governed by 
land board, co-management group, 
customary institution or other.
Village common grazing land 
or forest where access to land 
and resources are governed by 
village assembly, village council, 
community grazing association, 
customary institution or other
Individual land holdings managed 
by individual households. Lease or 
use rights may include agreements 
to allow access to secondary users.
Tenure ‘niches’ such as a tree or a 
well, which may exist on village 
land or individual holdings, for 
which access agreements would 
have been made. Governed by 
individual, resource water group, 
customary institution or other.
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simplified form) is provided in Figure 7.1.
3. The development of such a system should 
be guided by a clear framework/process 
for tenure and institutional development, 
which indicates key stages/steps, tools/
mechanisms, roles and responsibilities, and 
the required outputs, including customary 
and statutory structures and mechanisms 
for obtaining land/resource tenure security. 
The development of by-laws may be an 
important part of this. The system can learn/
build on the systems described in Sections 
4 and 5. It may be that in some cases such 
a system could be developed under current 
policy and legislation; in others a new 
legislative framework will be required. 
4. Registration (though not necessarily titling) 
will be required for at least some of the 
tenure layers of such a nested hierarchy. It 
may be the case that customary institutions 
are strong enough to control and manage 
the more detailed tenure systems and niches 
within a territory or rangeland; however, 
the rights to that territory or rangeland 
itself need to be formally protected. As Liz 
Alden Wiley (2005a) suggests: “All it takes 
is for the law to declare, for example, that a 
fully-described and signed off boundary by 
all parties concerned is the primary legal 
evidence of the boundary, and one that 
has to be upheld by the courts.” As such, an 
agreement does not have to detail every 
right to every individual, though it does rely 
upon the courts upholding the overall rights. 
5. A practical starting point for many 
communities, and one that does not have to 
wait for facilitating policy and legislation, can 
be the mapping and defining of community 
resources, including boundaries, which will 
produce a visual inventory of what is more 
commonly held only in people’s minds and 
transferred orally. This should be completed 
at a scale that reflects the territorial use of 
land and resources as well as the common 
properties found therein. Once this map 
and accompanying description have been 
produced, they can be used for a number 
of purposes, including the initiation of 
discussions and negotiations on land rights. 
Delimitation of the boundaries would be the 
next step in the process. These processes 
should first and foremost focus on the most 
vulnerable areas of land/resources: those 
areas of greatest importance to community 
livelihoods and/or to external interests – the 
“productivity hotspots” or “key-sites”.
6. The building (or rebuilding) of appropriate 
and effective institutions that can be 
considered legitimate, accountable, 
and transparent is likely to be the most 
challenging and important part of 
developing a sound governance and tenure 
system. This will include addressing and 
working through different power relations 
at all levels; changing mindsets, values, and 
understandings; facilitating negotiations 
and reaching consensus; and developing 
mechanisms for protecting tenure that 
can and will be enforced. The building of 
effective institutions can be a long and 
extended process and the commitment of all 
stakeholders to invest in long-term positive 
change is crucial. It will require ongoing 
monitoring, checking, and redeveloping as 
power relations shift between old and new 
actors, and priorities change.
7. Supporting activities around the (re)building 
of institutions is of great importance and 
is likely to be a determining factor in the 
success of the tenure system(s). This includes 
capacity building of all actors, but particularly 
of local communities to better understand 
and defend their rights. This will also involve 
advocacy, lobbying, networking, and, if 
necessary, direct action and protest. 
8. It is vital that the development of tenure 
systems and land use planning in 
rangelands is carried out as part of larger 
development processes at national 
(even cross-border) and local levels. 
Issues related to land and resources 
in the rangelands and the livelihoods 
that depend upon them cut across 
government sectoral departments. Such 
departments must work together on 
an integrated approach to rangeland 
development, of which securing rights 
to land and resources is one (but a very 
important) part.
9. International aid priorities and 
conditionality should focus on land 
tenure and administrative reform, 
including community-led administration 
systems. In particular, this should focus 
on those areas that are most at risk and 
likely to cause most damage to local 
livelihood systems. This would include 
much of the commons and, in particular, 
rangelands. 
On to the learning 
initiative
This scoping paper has brought 
together much of the current thinking 
and suggestions about how to move 
forward concerns about formalising 
customary land and resource tenure in 
the rangelands. The critical importance 
of the issues raised is growing daily as 
rangelands and their resources continue 
to be degraded, destroyed, appropriated, 
and encroached upon. Alternatives and 
potential solutions have been suggested, 
based on experience and good practice 
in rangelands and other socio-ecological 
systems. The further exploration of these 
alternatives and solutions will form the 
basis of the learning initiative planned for 
ILC members and partners taking place 
in West and East Africa and the Horn of 
Africa over the coming year. 
77
References
Adams, M. and S. Turner (2005) “Legal Dualism and Land Policy in Eastern and Southern Africa”. A paper 
presented at the conference “Land Rights for African Development: From Knowledge to 
Action”. Nairobi, 31 October–3 November 2005. Organised by UNDP and ILC. 
African Union, ECA, and AfDB Consortium (2010) “Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa”. 
Addis Ababa: AUC-ECA-AfDB Consortium.
African Union (2010) “Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa: Securing, Protecting and Improving the 
Lives, Livelihoods and Rights of Pastoralist Communities”. Department of Rural Economy and 
Agriculture, October 2010, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Alden Wily, L. (2011) “The Tragedy of Public Lands: The Fate of the Commons under Global Commercial 
Pressure”. Report for ILC.
Alden Wily, L. (2010) “Fodder for War: Getting to the Crux of the Natural Resources Crisis”. Washington: 
Rights and Resources Initiative. 
Alden Wily, L. (2009) “Recommended Strategy for Conflict Resolution of Competing High Pasture Claims 
of Settled and Nomadic Communities in Afghanistan”. Kabul: UNEP. 
Alden Wily, L. (2008a) “Community Based Pasture Management (CBPM), Afghanistan. Guidelines for 
Facilitators”. FAO SALEH, Afghanistan. 
Alden Wily, L. (2008b) “Whose Land Is It? Commons and Conflict States. Why the ownership of the 
commons matters in making and keeping peace”. Washington: Rights and Resources Initiative.
Alden Wily, L. (2005a) “The Commons and Customary Law in Modern Times: Rethinking the Orthodoxies”. 
A presentation to a conference hosted by UNDP on “Land Rights for African Development: 
From Knowledge to Action.” Nairobi, Kenya. 
Alden Wily, L. (2005b) “Step by Step Guidelines to Help Southern Blue Nile Communities Secure their 
Customary Land Areas”. Customary Land Security Project. USAID/PASA.
ALive (2007) “Policy Note: Maintaining mobility in pastoral systems in sub-Saharan Africa”. http://www.
alive-online.org
Amadou, B., G. Vogt, and K. Vogt (2003) “Developing a Community Conserved Area in Niger”. Parks, Vol. 
13, No. 1. 
Atkinson, D., M. Taylor, and F. Matose (2006) “Management of Some Commons in Southern Africa: 
Implications for Policy”. Policy Brief No. 23. Western Cape: PLAAS. 
AusAid (2008) Making Land Work: Volume One. Reconciling customary land and development in the 
Pacific. Canberra: AusAid. 
78
Babie-Kafaky, S., A. Mataji, and N.A. Sani (2009) “Ecological Capability Assessment for Multiple-Use in 
Forest Areas. Using GIS-Based Multiple Criteria Decision Making Approach”. American Journal 
of Environmental Sciences, Vol. 5, No. 6: 714-721.
Baha, B., T. Attito, S. Axwesso, R. Luhwago, and B. Charles (2008) “A Fact Finding Report on the Dispute 
between Pastoralists and Peasants in Kilosa District”. Unpublished report. 
Barrow, E. (1990) “Usufruct Rights to Trees: The Role of the Ekwar in Dryland Central Turkana”. Human 
Ecology, Vol. 18, No. 2.
Bassi, M. (2008) “Community Conserved Areas in the Horn of Africa.” Parks, Vol. 16.
Banikanta, M. and N. Birendra Kumar (2011) “Effect of Joint Forest Management on Community Forest 
Management in Odisha”. A paper presented at the IASC International Conference 10–14 
January 2011, Hyderabad. 
Binot, A., L. Hanon, D. Joiris, and D. Dulieu (2009) “The challenge of participatory natural resource 
management with mobile herders at the scale of a sub-Sahran protected area”. Biodiversity 
and Conservation, Vol. 18, No. 10.
Birch, I. and H. Shuria (2002) “Taking Charge of the Future: Pastoral institution building in northern Kenya”. 
Issue Paper No. 114. London: IIED. 
Blench, R. and F. Sommer (1999) Understanding Rangeland Biodiversity. London: ODI. 
Boedhihartono, I. and E. Barrow (2008) “Simulation models to monitor change” in Learning from 
Landscapes. Arborvitae Special.
Boku Tache (2009) “Pastoral Land Use Planning and Resource Management in Southern Oromia: An 
Integrated Landscape Approach”. A report for SOS Sahel Ethiopia and SC/US. Addis Ababa. 
Unpublished.
Boku Tache and B. Irwin (2003) “Traditional Institutions, Multiple Stakeholders and Modern Perspectives 
in Common Property. Accompanying Change Within Borana Pastoral Systems”. Securing the 
Commons No. 4. London: IIED.
Borrini-Feyerabend, G., M. Pimbert, M. Taghi Farvar, A. Kothari, and Y. Renard (2004) Sharing Power: 
Learning by Doing Co-Management Throughout the World. London: IIED and IUCN/CEESP/
CMWG, Cenesta.
Brown, M. (2000) “Emerging Coalitions and Sustainable Development in the Commons”. Paper presented 
at IASCP, 15 April 2000.
Cash, D., W.N. Adger, F. Berkes, P. Garden, L. Lebel, P. Olsson, L. Pritchard, and O.R. Young (2006) “Scale and 
cross-scale dynamics: governance and information in a multi-level world”. Ecology and Society 
11(2):8. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/art8/
79
Carney, D. (1998) “Sustainable Rural Livelihoods. What contribution can we make?” Paper presented 
at the Department for International Development’s Natural Resources Advisers’ Conference. 
DFID, July 1998.
Cavanna, S. and D. Abkula (2009) Scenario Planning with African Pastoralists: ‘How To’ Guide. London: 
IIED and SOS Sahel International UK. 
Cenerini, C. (2008) “Access to Legal Information and Institutions. Tales from Angola: San Land Rights in 
Huila Province”. LEP Working Paper. Rome: FAO. 
Chitakira, M. and E. Torgquebiau (2010) “Towards Balancing Production and Protection. Participatory 
Landscape Performance Assessment in Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa”. A paper presented at 
Innovation and Sustainable Development in Agriculture and Food, June 2010. Montpellier, 
France. 
COMESA (2009) “Hidden Value on the Hoof: Cross-Border Livestock Trade in Eastern Africa”. Policy Brief 
Number 2, February 2009. Kenya: PACAPS. 
Cotula, L. (2006) “Land and Water Rights in the Sahel. Tenure challenges of improving access to water for 
agriculture”. London: IIED.
Cousins, B. (2007) “More than socially embedded: The distinctive character of ‘communal tenure’ regimes 
in South Africa and implications for land policy”. Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 7, No. 3: 281-
315.
Cousins, B. (2002) “Legislating negotiability: Tenure reform in post-apartheid South Africa” in K. Juul and 
C. Lund (eds) Negotiating Property in Africa. New Hampshire: Heinemann. 
Crane, T. (undated) “If Farmers are First, Where Do the Pastoralists Go: Political Ecology and Participation 
in Central Mali”. http://www.future-agricultures.org/farmerfirst/files/T1a_Crane.pdf
Cullis, A. and C. Watson (2004) “Winners and Losers: Privatising the Commons in Botswana”. International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and Resource Conflict Institute (RECONCILE).
de Castro, F. (undated) “Landscape Diversity, Local Power and the Appropriation of Natural Resources 
in the Lower Amazonian Floodplain”. Unpublished paper for Indiana University, Bloomington.
DENR (2000) Manual on Participatory 3-Dimensional Modeling for Natural Resource Management. 
Philippines: DENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources).
Dietz, T., E. Ostrom, and P. Stern (2003) “The Struggle to Govern the Commons”. Science, Vol. 302.
Di Gessa, S. (2008) “Participatory Mapping as a Tool for Empowerment. Experiences and lessons learned 
from ILC network”. Rome: ILC/IFAD.
Fairhead, J. and M. Leach (1996) Misreading the African Landscape. Society and ecology in a forest-
savanna mosaic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
80
Fagerholm, N. and N. Kayhko (2009) “Participatory mapping and geographical patterns of social 
landscape values of rural communities in Zanzibar, Tanzania”. Fennia, Vol. 187: 43-60.
FAO (2005) “Participatory Land Delimitation – Experiences and Methodologies”. FAO Land Tenure 
Collection Number 2. http://www.fao.org/sd/dim_in1/in1_070301_en.htm
FAO (2002) Land Tenure Series 3, Land Tenure and Rural Development. http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/
Y4307E/y4307e05.htm 
FEMACT (2009) “Loliondo Findings”. 19–21 August 2009. 
Fernandez-Gimenez, M. (2006) “Land Use and Land Tenure in Mongolia: A Brief History and Current 
Issues”. USDA Forest Service Proceedings, RMRS-P-39.
Fernandez-Gimenez, M. (2002) “Spatial and social boundaries and the paradox of pastoral land tenure: A 
case study from post-socialist Mongolia”. Human Ecology 30(1): 49-78. 
Fisher, R., S. Maginnis, W. Jackson, E. Barrow, and S. Jeanrenaud (2005) “Poverty and Conservation. 
Landscapes, People and Power”. Landscapes and Livelihoods Series No. 2. Forest Conservation 
Programme. IUCN. 
Fisher, S., D. Ibrahim Abdi, J. Ludin, R. Smith, S. Williams, and S. Williams (2000) Working With Conflict. 
London: Zed Books.
Fitzpatrick, D. (2005) “’Best’ practice options for the legal recognition of customary tenure”. Development 
and Change, Vol. 36, Issue 3: 449-475.
Flintan, F. (2012) Changing Nature of Gender Roles in the Drylands of the Horn and East Africa: 
Implications for DRR Programming. Nairobi: REGLAP, Oxfam GB.
Flintan, F. (2011a) “Who’s Eating the Land? Exploring the linkages between land (tenure) security and 
food security”. A report for the International Land Coalition, Rome. 
Flintan, F. (2011b) “Broken Lands. Broken Lives? Causes, processes and impacts of land fragmentation in 
the rangelands of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda”. A report for REGLAP, Nairobi. 
Flintan, F. (2010) “Learning by Doing: Lessons in Improved Rangeland Management in Pastoral Areas 
through ELMT/ELSE”. A report for ELMT/ELSE, CARE Somalia, Kenya. 
Flintan, F. (2008) “Women’s Empowerment in Pastoral Societies”. Nairobi: IUCN-WISP.
Flintan, F. and A. Cullis (2010) Participatory Rangeland Management: Introductory Volume. Save the 
Children US, Addis Ababa. 
Flintan, F., Worku Chibsa, Dida Wako, and A. Ridgewell (2008) “Livestock and Livestock Movements in the 
Bale Mountains EcoRegion”. A report for the Bale EcoRegion Sustainable Management Project. 
SOS Sahel Ethiopia and FARM Africa. 
81
Fon, R. (2010) “MOBOSCUDA. Para-Legal Extension and Promotion of Land Rights for Mbororo Pastoralists 
of N.W. Region of Cameroon”. A presentation made at the ILRI Addis Ababa Share Fair, October 
2010.
Fratkin, E. and R. Mearns (2003) “Sustainability and pastoral livelihoods: Lessons from East African Maasai 
and Mongolia”. Human Organization, 62 (2): 112-122. 
Fuys, A., E. Mwangi, and S. Dohrn (2008) “Securing Common Properties in a Globablizing World”. 
Knowledge for Change Series. Rome: ILC. 
Gibson, C.C., E. Ostrom, and T.K. Ahn (2000) “The concept of scale and the human dimensions of global 
change”. Ecological Economics, 32(2):217-239.
Gil-White, F. (2003) “Ultimatum game with an ethnicity manipulation: Results from Khovdiin Bulgan 
Sum, Mongolia” in J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, H. Gintis, E. Fehr, and C. Camerer, Foundations 
of Human Sociality: Ethnography and Experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. http://www.hirhome.com/academic.htm
Guitton, M., C. Levret, and R. Delfortrie (2008) “Exchange of Innovative Experiences for a Sustainable 
Development in Mountain Areas”. France: EuroMontana.
HARDI (2010) “HARDI Madagascar”. A presentation made at ILRI Addis Ababa Share Fair, October 2010.
Hardin, G. (1968) “The Tragedy of the Commons”. Science, 162 (1968): 1243-1248.
Harris, L. and Helen D. Hazen (2006) Power of Maps: Counter Mapping for Conservation. An International 
E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 4 (1), 99-130.
Hatcher, J. (2009) “Dialogue, Consensus and Vision. PTND – More than a methodology. A strategy for 
territorial interaction and integration”. Land Tenure Working Paper 12. Rome: FAO.
Hesse, C. and B. Thébaud (2006) “Will Pastoral Legislation Disempower Pastoralists in the Sahel?” 
Indigenous Affairs, Vol. 6: 4-23.
Hesse, C. and P. Trench (2000) “Who’s Managing the Commons?” Securing the Commons Paper No 1. 
London: IIED. 
Hilhorst, T. (2008) “Local Governance Institutions for Sustainable Natural Resource Management in Mali, 
Burkina Faso and Niger”. KIT Working Paper Series, WPS.G1 Netherlands: KIT.
Holden, P., D. Grossman, and B. Jones (2008) “Community conserved areas in some southern African 
countries”. Parks, Vol. 16. 
IIED (2002) Shared Management of Common Property Resources in the Sahel. A Regional Action-
Research Programme. 1999-2002. Final report. London: IIED. 
IIED and SOS Sahel (2010) “Modern and Mobile. The future of livestock production in Africa’s drylands”. 
London: IIED. 
82
ILO (2005) International Workshop on Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples. New 
York, January 2005. http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/.../workshop_FPIC_ILO.doc
Institute on Governance (2002) “Governance Principles for Protected Areas in the 21st Century”. 
Discussion Paper for Parks Canada. Ottawa, Canada. 
Issa, H. and Maroussa, L. (2010) “L’Experience de Cadastrage a l’Echelle d’un Village du Niger”. A 
presentation made at the ILRI Addis Ababa Share Fair, October 2010.
IUCN (World Conservation Union) (2011) “The Land We Graze: A synthesis of case studies about how 
pastoralists’ organisations defend their land rights” IUCN-EASRO Office, Nairobi.
IUCN (2009) Dryland Opportunities. A new paradigm for people, ecosystems and development. 
Switzerland: IUCN. 
Jacquesson, S. (2010) “Reforming pastoral land use in Kyrgyzstan: from clan and custom to self-
government and tradition”. Central Asian Survey, Vol. 29, Issue 1: 103-118.
Joekes, S. and J. Pointing (1991) “Women in Pastoral Societies in East and West Africa”. Dryland Issues 
Paper No 28. London: IIED. 
Karky, B. S. and J. Cushing (2002) “Conservation through Insurance? A concept paper on the development 
of a community-owned saving, credit and insurance scheme”. http://www.mtnforum.org/
resources/library/karkx02a.htm 
Kangas, J., R. Store, and A. Kangas (2005) “Socioecological landscape planning approach and multicriteria 
acceptability analysis in multiple-purpose forest management”. Forest Policy and Economics, 
Vol. 7, Issue 4: 603-614.
Kipuri, N. and C. Sorensen (2008) “Poverty, Pastoralism and Policy in Ngorongoro: Lessons learned from 
the Ereto l Ngorongoro Pastoralist Project with implications for pastoral development and the 
policy debate”. ERETO/IIED. 
Kipuri, N. and A. Ridgewell (2008) “A Double Bind: The Exclusion of Pastoralist Women in the East and 
Horn of Africa”. London: Minority Rights International. 
Kirk, M., S. Prediger, T. Falk, and B. Vollan (2010) “Resource tenure reforms, preferences and enforcement 
mechanisms: Evidence on user cooperation in Namibia”. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
EXTARD/Resources/.../KirkpptCAP8.pdf
Kisamba-Mugerwa, W., J. Pender, and K. Edward (2006) “Impacts of Individualization of Land Tenure on 
Livestock and Rangeland Management in Southwestern Uganda”. Unpublished report for IFPRI. 
Krätli S. (2008) “Cattle breeding, complexity and mobility in a structurally unpredictable environment: 
the WoDaaBe herders of Niger”. Nomadic Peoples, 12(1): 11-41.




Larsen, K. and M. Hassan (2003) “Sedentarisation of Nomadic People: The Case of the Hawawir in Um 
Jawasir, Northern Sudan”. DCG Report No. 4. Norway: Noragric.
Lavigne-Delville, P. (2010) “Registering and administering customary land rights: Can we deal with the 
complexity?” in K. Deininger, C. Augustinus, S. Enemark, and P. Munro-Faure, “Innovations in 
Land Rights Recognition, Administration and Governance”. Joint Discussion Paper, the World 
Bank, GLTN, FIG, and FAO.
Lavigne-Delville, P., H. Ouedraogo, and C.Toulmin (2002) “Land tenure dynamics and government 
intervention: land tenure policy in West Africa: current issues, debate and innovation” in 
“Making Land Rights More Secure: International Workshop for Researchers and Policy Makers”, 
ed. GRAF/GRET/IIED. Ouagadougou, 19–21 March 2002. 
Leonard, R. and C. Toulmin (2000) “Women and Land Tenure: A Review of the Issues and Challenges in 
Africa”. Unpublished report for IIED Drylands Programme, Edinburgh.
Lind, J. and K. Sturman (2002) “Scarcity and Surfeit. The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts”. South Africa: ACTS 
and ISS. 
Little, P (2007) “Unofficial Cross-Border Trade in Eastern Africa”. Paper presented at the FAO Workshop 
on Staple Food Trade and Market Policy Options for Promoting Development in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. FAO, Rome: 1–2 March 2007.
Lund, C. (1998). Law, Power and Politics in Niger. Land Struggles and the Rural Code. Hamburg: LIT Verlag.
Maginnis, Stewart, William Jackson and Nigel Dudley (2004) “Conservation Landscapes: Whose 
Landscapes? Whose Trade-Offs?” in McShane, Thomas O. and Michael P. Wells (eds.). Getting 
Biodiversity Projects to Work: Towards More Effective Conservation and Development. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Marshall, G. (2008) “Nesting, subsidiarity and community-based environmental governance beyond the 
local level”. International Journal of the Commons, Vol. 2, No. 1: 75-97.
Mashingo, M. (2010) “Development of the Land Pathway”. A presentation at the ILRI Addis Ababa Share 
Fair, October 2010.
Maxwell, D. and K. Wiebe (1998) “Land Tenure and Food Security: A Review of Concepts, Evidence and 
Methods”. Research Paper No. 129. Wisconsin: Land Tenure Center.
Mearns, R., M. Leach, and I. Scoones (1997) “The Institutional Dynamics of Community-based Natural 
Resource Management: An Entitlements Approach”. A paper presented at a workshop at IDS, 
University of Sussex. 
Meinzen-Dick, R. and E. Mwangi (2008) “Cutting the web of interests: Pitfalls of formalizing property 
84
rights”. Land Use Policy, Vol. 26: 36-43.
Meinzen-Dick, R., R. Pradhan, and M. di Gregorio (2005) “Understanding property rights” in Collective 
Action and Property Rights for Sustainable Rangeland Management. CAPRi Research Brief. 
Meijs,M. and Kapitango, D. (2010) “Communal Land Registration”. Windhoek Ministry for Land and 
Resettlement. 
Menaut, J.-C. (1983) “The vegetation of African savannas” in F. Bourlière (ed.) Tropical Savannas. Ecosystems 
of the world 13, pp.109-149. Amsterdam/Oxford/New York: Elsevier.
MID-P (2010) “Whistle Blowing: The Case of Biliqo Bulesa”. Unpublished report by Merti Integrated 
Development Program (MID-P), Kenya. 
Mitul, B. (2011) “Joint Forest Management and Role of NGOS: Cases from Rajasthan, India”. Paper 
presented at the IASC International Conference 10–14 January 2011, Hyderabad.
Mongbo, R. (2010) “Land Law, Poverty and Land Access in Benin. Contribution of the CEBEDES NGO 
since 1994”. A presentation made at the ILRI Addis Ababa Share Fair, October 2010. 
Moorehead, R. (1998) “Mali” in C. Lane (ed) Custodians of the Commons. London: IIED
Mortimore, M. (1998) Roots in the African Dust: Sustaining the Sub-Saharan Drylands. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK
Mulianga, B. Alosa (2009) “Modelling Pastoral Mobility to Accommodate Pastoral Land Use in Land 
Administration, A Case Study of the Isiolo Area, Kenya”. MSc dissertation, International Institute 
for Geo-Information Science and Earth Observation, Eschede, the Netherlands. 
Mwangi, E. (2005) “The Dynamics of Land Use and Property Rights in Semi-Arid East Africa: The 
subdivision of group ranches in Kenya’s Maasailand” in “Collective Action and Property Rights 
for Sustainable Rangeland Management”. CAPRi Research Brief.
Mwangi, E. and S. Dohrn (2006) “Biting the Bullet: How to Secure Access to Resources for Multiple Users”. 
CAPRi Working Paper No. 47. Washington: IFPRI. 
Mwangi, E. and E. Ostrom (2009) “A Century of Institutions and Ecology in East Africa’s Rangelands: 
Linking Institutional Robustness with the Ecological Resilience of Kenya’s Maasailand” in V. 
Beckmann and M. Padmanabhan (eds) Institutions and Sustainability. Springer. 
Nefzaoui, A., M. El Mourid, Y. Saadani, H. Jallouli, N. Raggad, and G. Lazarev (2007) A Field Manual for the 
Preparation of a Participatory Community Development Plan. Tunisia: ICARDA, IFAD, Arab Fund 
for Economic and Social Development, and IDRC.
Nelson, F. (2009) (ed.) Community Rights, Conservation and Contested Land. The Politics of Natural 
Resource Governance in Africa. London: Earthscan.
Ngaido, T. (2005) “Can pastoral institutions perform without access options?” in “Collective Action and 
85
Property Rights for Sustainable Rangeland Management”. CAPRi Research Brief.
Ngaido, T. and N. McCarthy (2005) “Institutional Options for Managing Rangelands” in “Collective Action 
and Property Rights for Sustainable Rangeland Management”. CAPRi Research Brief.
Niamir-Fuller, M. (2005) “Managing Mobility in African Rangelands” in “Collective Action and Property 
Rights for Sustainable Rangeland Management”. CAPRi Research Brief.
Nicholson, D. (2009) “Community-Based Management of Rangeland Resources”. A report for ELMT/ELSE, 
CARE Somalia, Kenya. 
Nori, M. (2007) “Mobile Livelihoods, Patchy Resources and Shifting Rights: Approaching Pastoral 
Territories”. Rome: ILC.
Nori, M., J. Switzer, and A. Crawford (undated) “Herding on the Brink: Towards a Global Survey of 
Pastoral Communities and Conflict”. Occasional working paper from the IUCN Commission on 
Environmental, Economic and Social Policy. Geneva: IUCN and IISD.
Oba, G. (2005) “Botswana: Targeted Research and Training for IVP Botswana”. Mission report submitted to 
the Indigenous Vegetation Project. Norwegian University of Biosciences. 
Oba, G. and L. Kaitira (2006) “Herder knowledge of landscape assessments in arid rangelands in northern 
Kenya” in Journal of Arid Environments, Vol. 66: 168-186.
Odhiambo, Michael O. (2006) “Improving Tenure Security for the Rural Poor. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
– Case Study”. LEP Working Paper No 3. FAO. 
Okello, M., S. Ole Seno, and B. Wishitemi (2003) “Maasai community wildlife sanctuaries in the Selous 
Game Reserve, Tanzania”. Parks, Vol. 13, No. 1. 
Ostrom, E. (1994) “Neither Market nor State: Governance of common-pool resources in the twenty-first 
century”. IFPRI Lecture Series 2. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Ostrom, E., J. Burger, C. Field, R. Norgaard, and D. Policansky (1999) “Revisiting the Commons: Local 
Lessons, Global Challenges”. Science, Vol. 284. 
PAFID (2010) “Indigenous People in the Philippines”. A presentation made at ILRI Addis Ababa Share Fair, 
October 2010. Philippine Association for Intercultural Development Inc. (PAFID).
Pantuliano, S., O. Egemi, B. Fadlalla, and M. Farah (2009) “Put Out to Pasture. War, oil and the decline of 
Misseriyya Humr pastoralism in Sudan”. London: ODI. 
Pathak, N., E. Taraporewala, M. Wani, A. Bose, and A. Kothari (2008) “Towards Self-Rule and Forest 
Conservation in Mendha-Lekha Village, Gadchiroli”. Unpublished report. 
Petit, C., W. Carwright, and M. Berry (2006) “Geographical visualization: A participatory planning support 
tool for imagining landscape futures”. Applied GIS, Vol. 2, No. 3. 
86
Pires, L.M.L (2010) Strengthening Voices for Better Choices: Lessons learnt about the development of 
sectoral agendas for forest governance in Acre. Brasil: Amazon Projects Office IUCN. 
Platteau, J. P. (1996) “The evolutionary theory of land rights as applied to sub-Saharan Africa: a critical 
assessment”. Development and Change, Vol. 27, No. 1: 29-86.
Quan, J. (2000) “Land Boards as a Mechanism for the Management of Land Rights in Southern Africa”, 
in C. Toulmin and J. Quan (eds) Evolving Land Rights, Policy and Tenure in Africa, pp.197-205. 
London: DFID/IIED/NRI. 
Rass, N. (2006) “Policies and Strategies to Address the Vulnerability of Pastoralists in Sub-Saharan Africa”. 
Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative Working Paper No. 37.
Roe, D., F. Nelson, and C. Sandbrook (2009) “Community Management of Natural Resources in Africa. 
Impacts, experiences and future directions”. London: IIED. 
Rowley, J. and Mulugeta Terfa (2008) “A Study of Participatory Mapping Carried Out by SOS and SC-US in 
Southern Ethiopia”. Unpublished report for SC-US, Ethiopia. 
Salgado, P. Paneque, S. Corral Quintana, A. Guimarães Pereira, L. del Moral Ituarte, and B. Pedregal Mateos 
(2006) “Participative multi-criteria analysis for the evaluation of water governance alternatives. 
A case in the Costa del Sol (Malaga)”. Ecological Economics, Vol. 68.
Sandker, M., A. Puntodewo, F. Sitorus, H. Purnomo, Y. Yumte, M. Ruiz-Pérez, and B. Campbell (2010) “Spatial 
Projections of Participatory System Dynamics Modeling Outcomes: Exploring oil palm and 
REDD consequences for local livelihoods in Papua, Indonesia”. A paper presented at LANDMOD 
2010, Montpellier, February 2010.
SA PPLPP (2009) “Securing Community Tenure over Common Lands”. Good Practice Note, Delhi, India. 
Sayer, J. (2009) “Can conservation and development really be integrated?” Madagascar Conservation 
and Development, Vol. 4, Issue 1.
Shazali, S. and A. Ahmed (1999) “Pastoral Land Tenure and Agricultural Expansion: Sudan and the Horn 
of Africa”. Issue Paper No. 85. London: IIED. 
Smyth, D. (2001) “Joint management of national parks in Australia” in R. Baker, J, Davies and E. Young (eds) 
Working on Country. Contemporary indigenous management of Australia’s lands and coastal 
regions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Snorek, J. (2011) “Diverse Views of the Causes of Environmental Migration among Pastoralists in Northern 
Niger”. A paper presented at the IASCP Conference, Hyderabad, January 2011.
SOS Sahel International UK and IIED (2009) “Planning With Uncertainty: Using Scenario Planning with 
African Pastoralists”. London: IIED and SOS Sahel International UK. 
Steinmann, S. (1998) “Gender, Pastoralism and Intensification: Changing Environmental Resource Use 
87
in Morocco”. Yale Forestry and Environment Bulletin, Vol. 103. http://www.yale.edu/forestry/
bulletin.103pdfs/103Steinmann.pdf
Stites, E., D. Akabwai, D. Mazurana, and P. Ateyo (2007) “Angering Akuju: Survival and Suffering in 
Karamoja”. Boston: Tufts University. 
Sullivan, S. and N. Rohde (2002) “On non-equilibrium in arid and semi-arid grazing systems”. Journal of 
Biogeography, Vol. 29, No. 12.
Swallow, B. and D. Bromley (1992) “Institutions, Governance and Incentives in Common Property 
Regimes for African Rangelands”. Unpublished paper.
Tanner, C., P. de Wit, and S. Norfolk (2009) “Participatory Land Delimitation. An innovative development 
model based upon securing rights acquired through customary and other forms of occupation”. 
FAO Land Tenure Working Paper 13. Rome. 
Taylor, M. (2007) “CMNRM, Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Livelihoods: Developing criteria for 
evaluating the contribution of CBNRM to poverty reduction and alleviation in southern Africa”. 
CASS/PLAAS Occasional Paper Series 16. South Africa.
Turner, S. (2009) “Muloti Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Project. Supervision 
Mission”. Unpublished report. 
UCRT (2010) “Participatory Land Use Planning as a Tool for Community Empowerment in Tanzania”. 
UCRT (Ujamaa Community Resource Team). Gatekeeper Series No 147. London: IIED.
UNDP (2003) “Pastoralism and Mobility in Drylands”. Challenge Paper. http://www.pastoralpeoples.org/
bellagio/docs/global_drylands_imperative.pdf
Williams, T. (1998) “Multiple Uses of Common Pool Resources in Semi-Arid West Africa: A survey of existing 
practices and options for sustainable resource management”. Natural Resource Perspectives 
No. 28. London: ODI. 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Past experience and future options
Working Document Version 1.0 
Fiona Flintan 
for the International Land Coalition
January 2012




fax: +39 06 5459 3628
info@landcoalition.org
www.landcoalition.org
Via Paolo di Dono, 44
00142 – Rome, Italy
tel: +39 06 5459 2445
Our Mission
A global alliance of civil society and intergovernmental 
organisations working together to promote secure 
and equitable access to and control over land for 
poor women and men through advocacy, dialogue, 
knowledge sharing and capacity building.
Our Vision
Secure and equitable access to and control over land 
reduces poverty and contributes to identity, dignity 
and inclusion.
